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GAME OF THRONES: THE QATAR CRISIS,
FORCED EXPULSIONS ON THE ARABIAN
PENINSULA
Christopher R. Rossi *
ABSTRACT
In an extraordinary move, reflecting the Arabian Peninsula’s worst diplomatic dispute in decades,
the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt have expelled Qatari nationals and imposed an
air and sea blockade against Qatar because of its alleged support of terrorist organizations. In
June 2018, Qatar filed suit against the UAE at the International Court of Justice, alleging
discrimination in violation the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. This Article explores the problem of forced expulsion and the utility of
formal judicial redress at the level of the ICJ. Borrowing from the frame analysis of Erving
Goffman, this clash portrays the dispute in terms of ceremonial performance (dramaturgy) that
better suggests its removal to softer, more discursive forums for dispute settlement, such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council (“GCC”). Although already described as a major victim of this dispute,
the GCC may better preserve the dynamics of purposeful negotiation involving a situation that
bears resemblance to a family feud as much as a clash of state interests. This dispute highlights
the expanding problem of nationality, migration, and human rights in an age of terror, and the
limits but need of informal international legal means to best frame meaningful solutions to an
expanding problem. The twentieth century’s experience with the problem of forced migration
indicated the need for international legal reforms. The current problem on the Arabian Peninsula
signifies clearly that the project to address the issue continues. This Article explores the problem
of forced expulsion and the utility of formal judicial redress at the level of the ICJ. After reviewing
the history of hospitality and expulsion, this Article factors into the discussion the motivational
fear of terrorism and frames the discussion against the backdrops of competing UAE and Qatari
claims. The utility of litigating this case before the ICJ is then assessed in terms of substance and
dramaturgy, leading to a reconsideration of the value of a soft law solution, perhaps in a way that
can reinvigorate the GCC, which has been badly damaged by the dispute.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 11, 2018, the State of Qatar, located on the
northeastern headland of the Arabian Peninsula and surrounded by
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, filed suit against the United Arab
Emirates (“UAE”) at the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”). 1
Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ provides that the Court’s
jurisdiction comprises “all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties
and conventions in force.” 2 In its complaint, Qatar alleged that the
UAB had violated the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), to which both parties
belong. 3 This case again tests the jurisdictional limits of this
See Interpretation and Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (The State of Qatar v. The United
Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings (June 11, 2018),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180611-APP-01-00-EN.pdf
[hereinafter Qatar v. UAE Application]. See also International Court of Justice Press
Release, No. 2018/26 (June 11, 2018), http://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/172/172-20180611-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Press Release].
2
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36(1), https://www.icjcij.org/en/statute.
3
Qatar alleged violations of Arts. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7. See International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for
signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) [hereinafter
1

2
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convention, which Georgia unsuccessfully invoked against Russia for
its interventions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 4 and Ukraine
currently tests against Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its
treatment of Ukrainian and Tatar minorities. 5 In addition to the
individual human rights harms alleged, the Court likely will determine
CERD’s jurisdictional applicability to the travel embargo and media
restriction complaints.
Qatar accused the UAE of targeting Qataris based on their
national origin, 6 in violation of CERD’s prohibition against racial

CERD]. See also Press Release, supra note 1, at 1. Qatar acceded to the CERD on July
22, 1976 and the UAE on June 20, 1974. See U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV2&chapter=4&clang=_en.
4 See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, 2011, I.C.J 70, (Apr. 1), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/140/140-20110401-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (holding the Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain Georgia’s application).
5 See, e.g., Application of the International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Pending Cases, I.C.J.,
https://www.icj-cij.org/en/pending-cases. Additionally, Palestine has filed an interstate complaint against Israel for breaches of CERD “given the urgency of the
situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.” See The
State of Palestine Lodges an Interstate Complaint Against Israel under the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF., ST.
PALESTINE (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.mofa.pna.ps/en/2018/04/24/the-stateof-palestine-lodges-an-interstate-complaint-against-israel-under-the-convention-onthe-elimination-of-all-forms-of-racial-discrimination/. See also Israel Reacts to the
CERD Committee’s Statement, MISSION ISR. UNITED NATIONS GENEVA (May 14,
2018),
http://embassies.gov.il/UnGeneva/NewsAndEvents/MediaStatements/Pages/20
180504-Israel-reacts-to-the-CERD-Committee-statement.aspx.
Procedures
regarding the inter-state complaint process are handled by the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination in accordance with terms of the Convention.
See CERD, supra note 3, at Part II (detailing relevant articles governing the committee
and its procedures).
6 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 3; Application of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates) Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures,
Order, 2018 I.C.J. ¶ 19 (July 23), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
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discrimination. CERD Article 1(1) defines racial discrimination as “any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color,
descent, or national or ethnic origin” which has the purpose or effect
of impairing the exercise of human rights on an equal footing in fields
of public life. 7 In addition to objecting to Qatar’s factual allegation, the
UAE asserted that Qatar’s claims fall outside the scope of the ratione
materiae of CERD, and that granting preferences to nationals of a
particular country over another, although accenting the individual’s
present nationality, do not discriminate on the basis of the individual’s
national or ethnic origin: “[t]he UAE considers that the term ‘national
origin’ in Article 1, paragraph 1, of CERD is ‘twinned with’ ‘ethnic
origin’ and that ‘national origin’ is not to be read as encompassing
‘present nationality.’” 8
On June 5, 2017, the UAE severed diplomatic ties with Qatar, 9
expelled all Qataris within its borders, prohibited them from traveling
through the UAE, closed UAE airspace and seaports to Qatari
nationals, allegedly abridged Qatari rights of protest and free speech,
related/172/172-20180723-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Qatar v. UAE
Provisional Measures].
7
CERD, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
8
Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures, supra note 6, ¶¶ 23, 24. The UAE also
argued that the measures it adopted in June 2017 imposed requirements on entry or
re-entry into its territory by Qatari nationals and that there has been no mass
expulsion of Qataris. See id. ¶ 24. The Court concluded that Qatar’s claims “are
capable of falling within the scope of CERD ratione materiae” and that the Court need
not decide at this stage of proceedings whether the expression “national origin”
contained in CERD encompasses discrimination based on present nationality. Id. ¶
27. The Court voted in favor of three of nine requested provisional measures: that
separated Qatari families be reunited, that Qatari students resume their education in
the UAE or be given access to their educational records, and that Qataris be allowed
access to tribunals and other judicial organs of the UAE. The Court also ordered the
parties to refrain from actions aggravating the dispute. See ICJ PRESS RELEASE
(Unofficial), No. 2018/36, July 23, 2018, at 4, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/172/172-20180723-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf.
9 See Patrick Wintour, Gulf Plunged Into Diplomatic Crisis as Countries Cut Ties
with Qatar,
(June
5,
2017),
GUARDIAN,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/05/saudi-arabia-and-bahrainbreak-diplomatic-ties-with-qatar-over-terrorism (noting the severance in diplomatic
relations among Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain with Qatar).
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and shut down local Qatari media outlets, including the Qatari-owned
Al Jazeera Media Network. 10 When announcing its measures, the UAE
accused Qatar of destabilizing the region by supporting terrorist
organizations. 11 Invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, 12 Qatar claimed
the UAE’s actions interfered with marriage and choice of spouse
rights, along with rights of free expression, work, property enjoyment,
and equal treatment before tribunals. 13 In an effort to protect Qatari
nationals, Qatar requested cessation of discriminatory measures,
compliance with CERD obligations, assurance and guarantees of nonrepetition, reparations, and provisional measures of protection
pending final judgment. 14 Additionally, Qatar explored avenues of
redress with the UN International Civil Aviation Organization
(“ICAO”) in Montreal, 15 and filed a complaint with the World Trade

See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 3. Qatar also alleged the
UAE directly incited hate speech. See id. ¶ 4. See also S.G. Sreejith, Legality of the Gulf
Ban on Qatari Flights: State Sovereignty at Crossroads 43 AIR & SPACE L. 191–203 (2018).
11 See Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record CR 2018/13
Thursday, June 28, 2018, at 10 am ¶ 6, 11 (Mr. Alnowais: alleging that Qatar illegally
funneled one billion dollars “to entities affiliated with terrorist organizations”),
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180628-ORA-01-00-BI.pdf.
See also Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Yemen Sever Ties to Qatar over ‘Terrorism’ in Biggest
TIMES
(June
5,
2017),
Regional
Crisis
in
Years,
STRAITS
https://www.straitstimes.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-cuts-ties-to-qatarcites-terrorism.
12
A type of wardship originally applied by the court at Common law to
commit the mentally ill to the care of others, or to render service under a feudal
tenurial system. It grew by the early seventeenth century to associate regal power as
the “Parens patriae, the political father of his people.” Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins
of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 201 (1978).
13 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶¶ 31–46. During oral
proceedings, Qatar claimed “over 3,600 recorded marriages between Qataris and
Emiratis” had been affected by the measures. Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures,
Verbatim Record 2018/12, Wed. June 27, 2018, 10 am, ¶ 30, 41 (Ms. Amirfar).
14 See Interpretation and Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. The United Arab
Emirates), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of Protection, I.C.J.
2018 (June 11), https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/172/172-20180611-WRI01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter Qatar v. UAE Provisional Measures]. See also Qatar v.
UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶¶ 65–66.
15 See Qatar Airways Expected To Access New Flight Routes, AL JAZEERA (July 31,
2017) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/qatar-airways-expected-access10
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Organization (“WTO”), 16 which could lead to WTO panel
interpretation of the security exception under the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”). 17
Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt—not parties to CERD—
supported the UAE action in a “self-described [a]nti-Terror Quartet,”
and imposed land, sea, and air blockades on Qatar, in concert with the
UAE. 18 Adding to the economic and diplomatic blockade, Saudi
Arabia recently revealed plans to dig a canal to separate Qatar from the
Arabian mainland—also proposing to construct a nuclear waste site
and military base on the southern shore of the newly created island,
still within the Saudi frontier separating the two countries. 19 These
measures resurrect legal discussions that classify a blockade as an act

air-corridors-170801020434530.html (detailing closed-door discussions with the
ICAO to establish contingency air corridors for Qatar’s national airline).
16 See Qatar Files WTO Complaints Against The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain
TRADE
ORG.
(Aug.
4,
2017),
And
Saudi
Arabia,
WORLD
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/ds526_7_8rfc_04aug17_e.htm
(requesting dispute consultations).
17 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), WORLD TRADE
ORG.,
art.
XXI,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm#articleXXI. For a
discussion of art. XXI implications, see Johannes Fahner, Qatar Under Siege: Chances for
an Article XXI Case? EJIL: TALK! (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/qatarunder-siege-chances-for-an-article-xxi-case/.
18
Simon Henderson, A Field Trip to the Front Lines of the Qatar-Saudi Cold War,
FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 28, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/09/28/a-fieldtrip-to-the-front-lines-of-the-qatar-saudi-cold-war/.
19
Frank Jacobs, Saudi Arabia Threatens to Turn Qatar into an Island, BIGTHINK
(Apr. 12, 2018), https://bigthink.com/strange-maps/saudis-threaten-to-turn-qatarinto-an-island. See also James M. Dorsey, Saudi Arabia Turns Qatar into an Island,
(Apr.
16,
2018),
FAIROBSERVER
https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/qatar-crisissaudi-arabia-gulf-news-khaleej-33094/ (detailing plans for a $750 million, 37.5 mile
(60km) canal, 200 meters wide and 20 meters deep on the Saudi Arabian border of
the Peninsula).
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of war 20 and breathe life into the disfavored, early twentieth century
idea of the pacific blockade. 21
Unlike the articulation of human rights in the western tradition,
where abstract and political Enlightenment values of liberty and
equality take on deep significance, personalized and deeply familial
relationships among the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Qataris
inextricably combine with political questions. Frayed, yet deep kinship
ties, personalized rivalries, 22 and competing understandings of
Wahhabism 23 contribute to this regional crisis of royal factionalism.

20 See generally Quincy Wright, When Does War Exist? 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 362
(1932) (discussing the declaration of war doctrine with multiple references to the
legal significance of a blockade).
21 See generally Albert H. Washburn, The Legality of the Pacific Blockade I, 21
COLUM. L. Rev. 55 (1921).
22 See Randeep Ramesh, The Long-Running Family Rivalries Behind the Qatar
(July
21,
2017),
Crisis,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/21/qatar-crisis-may-be-rooted-inold-family-rivalries (noting that political issues in the region often involve family
issues). See also Saudi Arabia Cuts Off Qatar, ECONOMIST (June 10, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/06/10/saudi-arabiacuts-off-qatar (discussing troubled dynastic relations among the Al Thanis, Al
Khalifas, Al Sabahs and Al Sauds).
23
Saudi Arabia and Qatar adhere to the legal thought of the ninth-century
Islamic legal scholar, Ahmad ibn Hanbal; the Hanbali school is the most orthodox
of the Sunni law formulations, which developed into the Wahhabism movement,
named after the eighteenth-century theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab
(1703–1792). See Hanbali School of Law, OXFORD DICTIONARY ISLAM,
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e799 (last visited Dec. 2,
2018). Despite similarities emanating from the same Wahhabi and Hanbali teachings,
Qatar and Saudi Arabia state-religious relations differ in important respects, for
instance the lack of a religious police institution in Qatar to enforce public morality.
See Birol Baskan & Steven Wright, Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion Relations in
Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 33 ARAB STUD. Q. 96, 97 (2011). Qatari Wahhabism is
sometimes said to have formed given Qatar’s outward looking maritime trade
history—a Wahhabism of the sea—as opposed to Saudi Arabia’s more stringent
Wahhabism of the land. See James M. Dorsey, Wahhabism vs. Wahhabism: Qatar
challenges Saudi Arabia 2 (RSIS Working Paper No. 262, 2013),
https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/rsis-pubs/WP262.pdf [hereinafter
“Wahhabism v. Wahhabism”]. On Wahhabism’s history, place in the modern state,
relation to Islamic revivalism, and challenges to its peninsular hegemony, see
generally DAVID COMMINS, THE WAHHABI MISSION AND SAUDI ARABIA (2006).
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The dispute intermixes fundamentally autocratic, rentier 24 regime
structures with questions of political Islam and commercial enterprise.
It contrasts Qatar’s maverick international status and increasingly
autonomous and assertive foreign policy since the Arab Spring, 25 with
conservative Gulf Sheikdoms and Oman’s Sultanate. It poses
contextual challenges external to the ICJ’s formal dispute settlement
mechanisms, while raising questions and hopes of political
liberalization against a regional backdrop impacted by globalization,

Rentierism “refers to the (relative) dependence of states on rents for their
internal functioning. Rents are understood to be forms of income generated from
the export of natural resources, usually oil and gas.” ROLF SCHWARZ, WAR AND
STATE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST 121 n.5 (2012). Extensive research suggests
that rentierist economies impede the formation of strong, legitimate states and give
“life-support” to institutionally weak and politically accountable states. Id. at 2. For
citations to confirming literature, see id. at 4–5. See also ALLEN J. FROMHERZ, QATAR:
A MODERN HISTORY 111–124 (2017) (on peculiarities associated with Qatar as a
“classic rentier state”).
25 See generally Mohammed Nuruzzaman, Qatar and the Arap Spring: Down the
Foreign Policy Slope, 8 CONTEMP. ARAB AFF. 226 (2015) (on Qatar’s “high profile”
foreign policy); MATTHEW GRAY, QATAR: POLITICS AND THE CHALLENGES OF
DEVELOPMENT 207 (2013) (noting Qatar’s “highly activist” international role during
the Arab Spring); KRISTIAN COATES ULRICHSEN, QATAR AND THE ARAB SPRING 4
(2014) (noting Qatar’s shift in foreign policy in 2011 in favor of the Arab Spring
movement). The Arab Spring refers to the spread of mass opposition movements
across North Africa, the Levant and Persian Gulf States. It resulted in the “rapid
demise of Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak in Tunisia and Egypt, the eventual ousting
of Colonel Gaddafi and Ali Abdullah Saleh from power in Libya and Yemen,” and
intensified opposition to regimes in Bahrain and Syria, with “mounting tensions” in
the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia,” tensions in Oman, and political protests in
Kuwait. Interestingly, it sparked a “phenomenal increase in Twitter usage in all GCC
States, with Saudi Arabia registering the world’s fastest rate of growth in Twitter
users throughout 2012.” Id. at 5. Qatar has been described as a hybrid diplomatic
actor among Gulf States. It has worked with the US and Hamas, and with Hezbollah
and Iran. It has mediated behind the scenes with Israel and Lebanon, supported Arab
Spring revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and remained circumspect during the
uprising in Bahrain. See generally Andrew F. Cooper & Bessma Momani, Qatar and
Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy, 46 INT’L SPECTATOR 113 (2011). Qatar’s
support for the Al Jazeera media complex, which is based in Doha, has drawn huge
audiences throughout the Arab world “for its hard-hitting reporting and provocative
programming,” including reports critical of most Arab governments. J.E. Peterson,
Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State, 60 MIDDLE EAST J. 732 and
accompanying n.1 (2006).
24
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ineffective civic institutions, tribal patronage, agnatic seniority,
patrimony, and tremendous wealth and inequality. 26
Yemen, the Eastern government of Libya, Maldives,
Mauritania, and Comoros, in “brotherly” support of Saudi Arabia, cut
diplomatic ties with Qatar. Further, four other countries downgraded
relations with Qatar. 27 A thirteen point list of Saudi demands
accompanied what was described as the “Gulf’s worst diplomatic
dispute in decades,” 28 spawning a propaganda war in Washington, D.C.
and at the United Nations (“UN”). 29 Mediation efforts facilitated by
26 See MARC C. THOMPSON & NEIL QUILLIAM, POLICY MAKING IN THE
GCC: STATE, CITIZENS AND INSTITUTIONS 2 (Mark C. Thompson & Neil Quilliam
eds., 2017) (assessing the absence of responsive governance in GCC countries);
Ramesh, supra note 22 (noting the intermix of kinship ties and family relationships as
problems for political dispute settlement). See also Mehran Kamrava, Royal Factionalism
and Political Liberalization in Qatar, 63 MIDDLE EAST J. 401 (2009) (discounting
meaningful political liberalization in Qatar); and FROMHERZ, supra note 24, at 161
(noting that Qatari citizens can only vote if their family has been living on the
Peninsula since before 1930).
27
Jordan, Djibouti, Chad, and Niger. See Qatar-Gulf Crisis: Your Questions
JAZEERA
(Dec.
5,
1017),
Answered,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/06/qatar-gulf-crisis-questionsanswered-170606103033599.html#blockading-countries.
28
Patrick Wintour, Qatar Given 10 Days to Meet 13 Sweeping Demands by Saudi
(June
23,
2017),
Arabia,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabiaissues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade (listing the demands as: curbing
diplomatic ties with Iran, severing ties to terrorist organizations, shutting down AlJazeera, shutting down other news outlets such as Arabi21 and Rassd, terminating
Turkey’s military presence in Qatar, stopping funding means for terrorist individuals
and groups, handing over “terrorist figures”, ending interference in other countries’
internal affairs, stopping contact with political opposition forces in Saudi Arabia, the
UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain, compensating blockading powers for associated financial
losses, consenting to monthly external compliance checks, aligning militarily,
politically, socially, and economically with other Gulf and Arab countries, agreeing
to all demands within 10 days).
29
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Qatar Pulls the Human Rights Card in Washington
POL’Y
(July
11,
2017)
PR
Blitz,
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/11/qatar-pulls-the-human-rights-card-inwashington-pr-blitz-saudi-arabia-gulf-blockade/ (noting Qatar’s emphasis on the
blockade’s human rights costs); Gulf Crisis: Qatar FM Meets UN Security Council
JAZEERA
(July
1,
2017),
Members,
AL
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/gulf-crisis-qatar-fm-meets-security-
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Kuwait and backed by the United States (“U.S.”), the UN, and
European powers, reduced the demands to six principles around which
resolution of the crisis now revolves. 30 Even reduced to six principles,
the demands to end the blockade reflect the imprecisions of a pactum
de contrahendo. 31 Such clauses permit hostile bargaining partners
breathing space to sidestep temporarily nettlesome details or wrongful
acts that could impede negotiations, however they can fruitlessly
contribute to impasse by avoiding or postponing discussion of details
at the heart of the dispute. 32
A report issued by the human rights organization, Amnesty
International, labeled the one week deadline issued against Qataris by
council-members-170701042724973.html (on Qatar’s UN mission’s efforts to sway
non-permanent members of the Security Council). See also Hassan Hassan, Qatar Won
POL’Y
(June
4,
2018),
the
Saudi
Blockade,
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/04/qatar-won-the-saudi-blockade/
(estimating that Qatar and Saudi Arabia spent about $1.5 billion each on public
relations campaigns and that Qatar seems to be winning in the court of public
opinion).
30
In a joint statement issued on July 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt,
and Bahrain listed the six principles as: 1) Commitment to combat extremism and
terrorism in all forms and to prevent their financing or the provision of safe haven;
2) prohibiting acts of incitement; 3) full commitment to Riyadh Agreement 2013 and
Gulf Cooperation Council Supplementary Agreement; 4) commitment to outcomes
of the Arab-Islamic-US summit in Riyadh in May 2017; 5) refraining from interfering
with internal affairs of States; and 6) supporting the responsibility of all states to
confront all forms of extremism and terrorism. See Joint Statement by the Foreign
Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, EMBASSY
KINGDOM
SAUDI
ARABIA
(July
5,
2017),
https://www.saudiembassy.net/statements/joint-statement-foreign-ministerssaudi-arabia-egypt-united-arab-emirates-and-bahrain. After nine months of
negotiation, Qatar made several concessions; it pledged not to naturalize GCC
citizens and it asked several members of the Muslim Brotherhood who had fled
Egypt to Qatar to leave or not to return. See DAVID B. ROBERTS, QATAR: SECURING
THE GLOBAL AMBITIONS OF A CITY-STATE 152 (2017).
31
An agreement to conclude a future agreement. See Ulrich Beyerlin, Pactum
de Contrahendo, Pactum de Negotiando, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 854 (Rudolf Berhardt ed., 1984).
32 See Stephen L. Kass, Obligatory Negotiations in International Organizations, 3
CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 36, 39 (1965) (breathing space); Antonio Cassese, The Israel-PLO
Agreement and Self-Determination, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 564, 566 n.6 (1993) (quoting
Beyerlin’s view on potential employment to avoid obligation).
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the UAE and the other states across the Gulf as “arbitrary” and
contemptuous of human dignity. 33 Additionally, the report noted the
banishment extended to mixed-nationality families, placing them at the
“heart of a political crisis.” 34 The head of Qatar’s National Human
Rights committee estimated that the humanitarian costs of the
blockade would directly affect 19,000 Qataris living in the four
blockading countries and possibly 11,300 individuals from the
blockading countries living in Qatar. 35
The targeting of Qataris, collectively referred to as
“Discriminatory Measures,” 36 drew the attention of six special
rapporteurs, 37 who made an urgent appeal to the UAE of the adverse
situation. 38 The UAE objected to and dismissed the concerns without
Gulf/Qatar Dispute: Human Dignity Trampled and Families Facing Uncertainty as
INT’L
(June
19,
2017),
Sinister
Deadline
Passes,
AMNESTY
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-humandignity-trampled-and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/.
34 Id. A Qatari National Human Rights Committee report approximated that
8,254 Saudis, 2,349 Bahrainis, and 784 Emiratis lived in Qatar prior to the crisis and
that 1,927 Qataris lived in these three neighboring countries. See Qatar: Isolation
RTS.
WATCH
(July
12,
2017),
Causing
Rights
Abuses,
HUM.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abuses.
35
Krishnadev Calamur, Tillerson Calls Qatar’s Position in Dispute with Arab
(July
11,
2017),
States
‘Very
Reasonable’,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/qatar-tillerson/533259/.
36 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 5. The UAE later modified
the deportation decree to exempt Qataris married to Emirati nationals. See UAE
Exempts Qataris Married To Emiratis From Expulsion Order: Paper, REUTERS (June 12,
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-emirates-idUSKBN1930V8.
37
Communication to Government of the United Arab Emirates, Mandates
of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom
of opinion and expression; the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the
Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants; the Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance; the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human
rights while countering terrorism; and the Special Rapporteur on the right to
education, 18 August 2017. See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 14.
38
Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the
Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates, AU ARE 5/2017 (Aug. 18,
2017), at 1, 4 [hereinafter Joint Communication of Special Procedures Mandate
Holders] (connecting concerns about the right to movement and residence, family
33
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addressing them. 39 A Human Rights Watch report detailed the human
toll in terms of stranded workers, family separations, and interrupted
medical care and education. 40 Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, expressed “alarm” about the human
rights impact caused by the “overly broad” measures. 41 In addition, the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(“OHCHR”) affirmed the actions as arbitrary and noted in December
2017 that most measures made “no distinction between the
Government of Qatar and its population,” thus they amounted to
unilateral coercions that had a “potentially durable effect on” the
human rights of those affected. 42
Leading human rights authorities, John Dugard and William
Schabas, concluded the coalition’s actions illegally comprised unilateral

unity, education, work, freedom of expression, health and the right to property in
relation to CERD).
39 See Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 14 (noting that the UAE
registered high displeasure at receiving the Sept. 18, 2017 communication—phrased
as an urgent appeal—and declined to address the asserted violations).
40 Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 12, 2017),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/13/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abuses.
41 Qatar Diplomatic Crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on Impact on Human Rights, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER
HUM.
RTS.
(June
14,
2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=217
39&LangID=E.
42
OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, 17–24 November 2017,
Rep. on the Impact of the Gulf Crisis on Human Rights, ¶¶ 60 (“durable effect”), 61
(“unilateral”), and 64 (“no distinction”), (2017) http://nhrc-qa.org/en/themencodepdf-viewer/?file=http://nhrc-qa.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/OHCHRTM-REPORT-ENGLISH-1.pdf [hereinafter OHCHR Report]. See also Qatar
Diplomatic Crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al
Hussein on Impact on Human Rights, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS. (June
14,
2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=217
39&LangID=E (expressing “alarm about the possible impact on many people’s
human rights” given the decision by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain to
ties with Qatar.); Statement of Dr. Ali Smaikh Al Marri, Chairman, National Human
Rights Committee (Qatar), 10:16 mark [undated], http://nhrc-qa.org/ (affirming
that “the continuation of this crisis will damage the social fabric of the Gulf family.”).

12

2019

Game of Thrones: The Qatar Crisis

7:1

coercive measures (sanctions). 43 Under their analysis, the UAE actions
violated the Declaration on Friendly Relations, 44 the Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 45 the UN
Charter, and to the extent coalition partners have acceded to them, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. 46
Details may be hard to pin down. Professors Dugard and Schabas
concluded that “Qatar has committed no internationally wrongful
act.” 47 Unsuccessful interventions at the Human Rights Council, 48 and
by Kuwait as mediator, 49 propelled the case to The Hague, a forum
generally and historically eschewed by Arab countries. 50
The anti-Qatar bloc seeks to pressure Qatar into ending
support for various Islamist groups, including Ahrar al-Sham in
northern Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, religious
insurrectionists in Libya, anti-Saudi and Shia communities in Saudi
Arabia’s fractious eastern Qatif province, 51 and Saudi-opposed Houthi
rebels in Yemen. Regarding the latter claim, a 2014 war pitting Saudi
43 See Professor John Dugard & Professor William Schabas, The Blockade of
Qatar One Year On: Violations of Human Rights and Coercive Measures 1-7 (June 5, 2018),
http://tgchambers.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Qatar-report.pdf. See also
OHCHR Report, supra note 42, ¶ 61 (characterizing the UAE measures as
conforming to the definition of unilateral coercive measures).
44
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, at Annex, PP 9 (Oct. 24, 1970).
45 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10, at 128–139 (2001).
46 See Dugard & Schabas, supra note 43, at 5.
47
Dugard & Schabas, supra note 43, at 4.
48 See, e.g., Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar Calls on Human Rights Council
to Immediately End Siege Countries’ Violations, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2018/02/28/qatar-calls-onhuman-rights-council-to-immediately-end-siege-countries’-violations
(presenting
Qatar’s appeal to the Human Rights Council).
49
Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 17.
50 See Cesare P.R. Romano, International Judicialization in the Arab World: An
Initial Assessment 33–34 (iCourts Working Paper Series, No. 49, 2016) (noting the
relatively few cases since 1946 where Arab states have been involved as applicant or
respondent before the ICJ).
51
Wintour, supra note 9.
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interests and ground forces (supporting the internationally recognized
Hadi regime, which controls the major Indian Ocean port of Aden)
against the Iranian-backed Houthi Zaydi Shiites (who control Yemen’s
capital city, Sana’a) has turned into the “world’s largest humanitarian
catastrophe” and a deepening security problem for Saudi Arabia. 52
Qatar, although Sunni-dominated, shares close economic ties and
offshore energy interests with Iran and its Shia population. 53 An alleged
computer hack of a speech by the Qatari emir in support of Iran
sparked this crisis. 54 The Saudi-led alliance in Yemen has since
Bruce Riedel, In Yemen, Iran Outsmarts Saudi Arabia Again, BROOKINGS
INST. (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/12/06/inyemen-iran-outsmarts-saudi-arabia-again/. See also Yemen, Humanitarian Response Plan
January-December
2018,
UNOCHA
(Jan.
2018),
at
2,
https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-humanitarian-response-plan-januarydecember-2018-enar (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) (noting 22.2 million people in Yemen
now need humanitarian or protection assistance, including 11.3 million who are in
acute need). See also Helene Cooper, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, & Eric Schmitt, Army
Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels, N.Y. TIMES (May 3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/us/politics/green-berets-saudiyemen-border-houthi.html (discussing the secret movement of U.S. Army Special
Forces to the Yemeni border in support of the Saudi military campaign and the
launching of more than 100 missiles since 2015 into the Saudi kingdom by Houthi
forces).
53 See Tim Lister, Unraveling the Qatar Crisis: Sunni, Shia, Saudi, Iranian—and
Trump, CNN (June 7, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/middleeast/qatarcrisis-analysis/index.html (noting the huge gas field in the Persian Gulf shared by
Qatar and Iran [known in Qatar as the North Field and in Iran as South Pars]);
LAWRENCE G. POTTER, The Rise and Fall of Port Cities in the Persian Gulf, in THE
PERSIAN GULF IN MODERN TIMES: PEOPLE, PORTS, AND HISTORY 131, 145
(Lawrence G. Potter ed., 2014) (noting the necessity of Iranian-Qatari cooperation
to develop their shared undersea gas field).
54
Qatar v. UAE Application, supra note 1, ¶ 21 (noting the “spark that lit
the fuse”). See also Patrick Wintour, Russian Hackers to Blame for Sparking Qatar Crisis,
(June
7,
2017),
FBI
Inquiry
Finds,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/07/russian-hackers-qatar-crisisfbi-inquiry-saudi-arabia-uae (questioning who would have commissioned the
freelance hackers); Greg Myre, Report: United Arab Emirates Hacked Qatar, Sparking
Gulf Crisis, NPR (June 17, 2017) (quoting unnamed U.S. intelligence officials from a
Washington Post report). The quotations, which appeared on a crawl across T.V.
screens on May 23, 2017 and attributed to the emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani, read: “Iran is an Islamic power in the region that cannot be ignored;” and
“Hamas is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” Dexter Filkins,
Quest to Remake the Middle East, NEW YORKER (Apr. 9, 2018),
52
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removed Qatar from its coalition, 55 and Qatar has restored full
diplomatic ties with Iran. 56 This removal from the alliance adds to
fissures exposed during a Saudi-Qatar dispute for influence in Syria,
which impeded opposition efforts to topple Bashar al-Assad’s
regime. 57 Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain broke diplomatic
relations with Qatar in 2014, 58 based on violations of a non-public
security understanding crafted at a Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
Riyadh meeting in November 2013. 59
Omani and Kuwaiti intermediaries provided a pathway for
reconciliation within the GCC that led to the Riyadh Supplemental
Agreement in November 2014, which affirmed norms of noninterference. 60 Saudi sources now allege Qatar never fulfilled those
mostly concealed-from-public commitments, 61 pointedly blaming Al
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-saudi-princes-quest-toremake-the-middle-east.
55 Qatar Reneged on Its Promises, Documents Reveal, SAUDI GAZETTE (June 11,
2017), http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/512571/SAUDI-ARABIA/Qatar.
56 See UAE Responds as Qatar Restores Full Diplomatic Ties With Iran, NATIONAL
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/uae-responds-as-qatarrestores-full-diplomatic-ties-with-iran-1.622417 (eliciting the claim from the UAE
Foreign Minister that Qatar has “escalated its troubles”).
57 See Saudi-Qatar Crisis Puts Syrian Rebels in Tricky Position, INQUIRER.NET
(June 17, 2017), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/906325/saudi-qatar-crisis-puts-syrianrebels-in-tricky-position. Al-Assad’s regime is likely to prevail over this revolt
stemming from the 2010 Arab Spring, notwithstanding billions of dollars of western
and Gulf state assistance for the opposition, and one of the costliest covert action
programs in the history of the CIA. See Aron Lund, How Assad’s Enemies Gave Up on
FOUND.
(Oct.
17,
2017),
the
Syrian
Opposition,
CENTURY
https://tcf.org/content/report/assads-enemies-gave-syrian-opposition/.
58 See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 151 (noting the recall of ambassadors from
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain).
59 See Islam Khalid Hassan, GCC’s 2014 Crisis: Causes, Issues and Solutions, AL
JAZEERA
CTR.
STUD.
(Mar.
31,
2015),
http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2015/03/201533172623652531.html.
60
Amira Howeidy, Saudia Arabia, UAE Make Amends With Qatar, ALAHRAMWEEKLY (Nov. 20–26, 2014), http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/7789.aspx
(noting parties variously refer to the Riyadh Consultative Summit document as
“document,” “agreement,” or “supplementary agreement,” and that its contents have
not been disclosed fully).
61 See, e.g., Qatar Reneged on Its Promises, Documents Reveal, SAUDI GAZETTE (July
11, 2017), http://saudigazette.com.sa/article/512571/SAUDI-ARABIA/Qatar
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Jazeera media platforms and professionals for their advancement of an
anti-GCC agenda. 62 The anti-Qatar coalition, fortified by the
solidification of Egyptian General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s 2013 coup d’état
against Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (which ended
Egypt’s restive thirty-month failed transition to democracy following
President Hosni Mubarak’s forced resignation), provide stout
opposition to a negotiated end to Qatar’s isolation. 63 This stalemate
may contribute to sub-regional competitions stretching from the Gaza
Strip to the Horn of Africa 64 and represents the ongoing repercussions
of the tumultuous 2011 Arab Spring. 65
In May 2018, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister concluded that no
“glimmer of hope for a solution” appears on the horizon. 66 Employing
an alliterative taxonomy of dysfunctionality, Richard Falk described
the crisis as a multidimensional descent into “chaos, conflict, and
coercion” for the region. 67 Falk noted “dubious major assumptions”
of the anti-Qatar bloc, including the coalition’s identification of the
Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization and the coalition’s
“own extensive funding of radical madrassas throughout the Muslim
(referring to the Riyadh Agreement of 2013 and the Supplementary Agreement of
2014).
62
Ben Flanagan, Al Jazeera Bias Under Spotlight Amid GCC Rift, ARABNEWS
(June 13, 2017), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1114206/science-technology.
63 See ULRICHSEN, supra note 25, at 173–74 (noting the “rollback of the Arab
uprisings in North Africa,” including Egypt’s return to “a military-led status quo
ante,” presented Qatar with immediate foreign policy challenges).
64 See Robert Malley, What Happens in the Gulf Doesn’t Stay in the Gulf,
(June
7,
2018),
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/somalia-gulf-crisisvegas-rules/562292/; Matthias Sailer & Stephan Roll, Three Scenarios for the Qatar
Crisis: Regime Change, Resolution or Cold War in the Gulf, SWP COMMENT 3 (July 2017),
https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/the-qatar-crisis-three-scenarios/.
65 See generally Silvia Colombo, The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double
Standards, 47 ITALIAN J. INT’L AFF. 110 (2012) (on the difficulties managing cohesive
policy within the GCC since the Arab uprisings in 2011).
66 No End in Sight to Qatar Row: Bahrain, KHALEEG TIMES (May 27, 2018),
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/region/qatar-crisis/no-end-in-sight-to-qatar-rowbahrain (quoting Sheikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa).
67
Richard Falk, The Gulf Crisis Reassessed from An International Law Perspective,
GLOBAL RES. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.globalresearch.ca/the-gulf-crisisreassessed-from-an-international-law-perspective/5632113.
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world.” 68 Falk suggested that invoking terrorist concerns as a basis for
expelling Qataris serves as a pretext for indirectly confronting Iran by
directly disciplining Qatari nationals for their dynastic monarchy’s
deficient foreign policy alignment with the House of Al Saud. 69 Other
commentators regard the dispute as an attack against Qatar’s
sovereignty with the Saudi intent of turning Qatar into a vassal state. 70
Still others warn of Qatar’s dangerous practice of playing much larger
opposing forces against each other and moderating difficulties that
arise through recourse to its only unquestioned comparative
advantage—checkbook diplomacy. 71 The crisis also stirs speculation
about the regime change intentions of the Saudi and Emirati royal
families against the Al Thanis in Doha. 72 Bad blood dates from leaked
recordings in 2014 involving the former emir of Qatar and his foreign
minister, who contemplated the dissolution and division of Saudi
Arabia based on internal signs of instability in the House of Saud. 73
Reports further indicate U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
intervened in June 2017 “to stop a secret Saudi-led, UAE backed plan

Id.
See id.
70 See Richard Sokolsy & Aaron Miller, Qatar Crisis: Can Rex Tillerson Fix This
(July
10,
2017),
Mess?
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT INT’L PEACE
https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/10/qatar-crisis-can-rex-tillerson-fix-thismess-pub-71483 (casting doubt on diplomacy as a solution for Saudi intentions of
turning Qatar into a semi-vassal state); and Hassan, supra note 29 (discussing the goal
of turning Qatar into a vassal state).
71 See Qatar: A Dangerous Alliance, Qatar: A Dangerous Alliance-Full
(Sept.
22,
2017),
Documentary,
YOUTUBE
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kHXXan2CRZQ (interviewing Hussain
Haqqari, Alex Vatanka and Jonathan Schanzer).
72
Sailer & Roll, supra note 64, at 2 (concluding that a coming Cold War in
the Gulf is the most likely scenario but “not completely excluding” regime change
intentions against the Qatari leadership).
73 Former Qatari Emir Conspired with Qadaffi Against Saudi Arabia, AL ARABIYA
ENGLISH
(June
8,
2017),
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/features/2017/06/08/Former-Qatari-Emirconspired-with-Gaddafi-against-Saudi-Arabia.html (discussing leaked audio
recordings leaked in 2014 but dating possible to 2003 allegedly of Qatar emir Hamad
bin Khalifa and foreign minister Hamad bin Jassim with former Libyan Leader
Muammar Qaddafi).
68
69
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to invade and . . . conquer Qatar.” 74 Such a take-over would
immediately staunch rapidly depleting Saudi financial reserves, which
have dwindled by one-third since 2015 due to downward pressure on
world oil prices. 75
More than affecting Qatar’s sovereign independence, the
embargo has added another intractable conflict to the Middle East
landscape. The embargo has dealt a substantial blow to the region’s
premier international cooperation organization, the GCC, 76 which is
too deeply divided to facilitate policy coordination. It has also
paralyzed the Arab League, which kept the issue off its recent Cairo
agenda and refused to issue visas to Qatar’s delegation. 77 It has
74
Alex Emmons, Saudi Arabia Planned to Invade Qatar Last Summer. Rex
Tillerson’s Efforts to Stop it May have Cost him his Job, INTERCEPT (Aug. 1, 2018),
https://theintercept.com/2018/08/01/rex-tillerson-qatar-saudi-uae/.
75 See Bruce Riedel, Kings and Presidents: Whither the Special Relationship with Saudi
Arabia? BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 21, 2017), at 5–6, https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/11/fp_20171121_saudi_us_transcript.pdf. Reidel noted the
Saudi cradle-to-grave social security system is financially unsustainable when oil
prices dip below 80–85 dollars per barrel, id. at 5, in addition to costs associated with
its disastrously expensive war in Yemen (estimated at $700 million per month), id. at
7.
76
Geoffrey Martin, Is the GCC Dead After the Qatar Crisis? GULF ST.
ANALYTICS (Feb. 5, 2018), https://gulfstateanalytics.com/gcc-dead-qatar-crisis/
(answering yes but questioning whether the GCC was ever alive); Abdullah Al Shayji,
Qatar Crisis Casts a Shadow on GCC Unity, GULF NEWS (June 28, 2017),
https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/qatar-crisis-casts-a-shadow-on-gcc-unity1.2050430 (noting the “snowballing crisis . . . could undermine the [GCC] bloc”).
The GCC formed in 1981 as the political and economic alliance of six Gulf States,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. See Hasan-Askari Rizvi,
Gulf Cooperation Council, 35 PAKISTAN HORIZON 29 (1982). A May 2018 GCC summit
hosted by the United States has been postponed until September with the hope that
intermediaries will by then be able to get the disputants back to the GCC. See Warren
Strobel & Jonathan Landay, White House Postpones Planned Trump Summit with Gulf
Leaders: Sources, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usagulf-summit/white-house-postpones-planned-trump-summit-with-gulf-leaderssources-idUSKCN1HA2H2. For information on the GCC and its Charter, see
generally SECRETARIAT GEN. GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL, http://www.gccsg.org/en-us/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2018).
77 Egypt ‘Blocks Qatari Officials’ from Attending Arab League Meeting Amid Gulf
(May
10,
2018),
Crisis,
THENEWARAB
https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2018/5/9/egypt-blocks-qatari-officialsfrom-attending-arab-league-meetings.
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spawned a breakaway Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council, which has
already projected a sixty month Ala’azm (Determination) Strategy to
integrate the two countries in ways that compromise directly the future
of the GCC. 78 It has splintered the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC), which formed as a representation of the universal
Muslim sense of unity (Ummah), 79 but now absorbs criticism as a
financially dependent agency of Saudi hegemony. 80 Qatar has criticized
the OIC for siding with the anti-Qatar bloc, 81 drawing key support

78 See KSA and UAE Announce Joint Vision for Economic, Developmental and
Military Integration Through 44 Strategic Projects, SAUDI PRESS AGENCY (June 7, 2018),
https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1774108
(announcing the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council’s Ala’azm Strategy). See also
Simon Henderson, New Arab Gulf Council Reflects Shift in Strategy, Leadership, HILL (June
10, 2018), http://thehill.com/opinion/international/391431-new-arab-gulf-councilreflects-shift-in-strategy-leadership (suggesting the death of the GCC in the wake of
the formation of the Saudi-Emerati Coordination Council).
79 See
History,
ORGANIZATION
OF
ISLAMIC
COOPERATION,
https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en
(noting
the
organization formed in Rabat in 1969 to “galvanize the [u]mmah into a unified
body”) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018). See also OLIVER ROY, GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE
SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 1 (2006) (defining Ummah); Ejaz Akram, Muslim Ummah
and its Link with Transnational Muslim Politics, 46 ISLAMIC STUD. 381 (2007) (contrasting
the meaning of Ummah with western nation-state notions of peace and security).
80 See Shahram Akbarzadeh & Zahid Shahab Ahmed, Impacts of Saudi
Hegemony on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), __INT’L J. POLIT. CULT. SOC’Y
__ (forthcoming; copy on file with author). With 57 members representing 1.6 billion
Muslims, the OIC is the world’s second largest international organization after the
UN. Id.
81 See Qatar Condemns Statement by OIC General Secretariat, PENINSULA (June 7,
2017), https://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/07/06/2017/Qatar-condemnsstatement-by-OIC-General-Secretariat.
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from Turkey, which chairs the OIC 82 and, along with the United
States, 83 operates its own military bases in Qatar. 84
The embargo is now a “slow-motion strategic failure,” having
imprudently discounted Qatar’s small population yet immense
wealth, 85 its commercial and strategic access to the sea, and the
availability of import substitutes once provided by blockading
powers. 86 The failure of the embargo exposes cross-purpose messages
and diminished U.S. influence in the region, which formerly
maintained appearances of common interests and regional cohesion
on missile defense needs, counterbalances to Iran’s nuclear program,
82 See Turkey: Isolation of Qatar Is Not Islamic, AL JAZEERA (June 13, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/turkey-qatar-isolation-islamic-values170613131822995.html (noting Turkish President Ergodan’s denunciation of Qatar’s
isolation).
83
Qatar hosts more than 10,000 US and coalition military personnel at the
Al Udeid Air Base, which serves as the forward headquarters for the U.S. Air Forces
Central Command and its Combined Air Operations Center (CENTCOM). See Qatar
to Expand US Airbase as Defence Chief Visits DC, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/01/qatar-expand-airbase-defence-chiefvisits-dc-180129192013144.html. See also Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/udeid.htm (noting the base is the
U.S.’ largest in the Middle East) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
84 See Shehab Al-Makahleh, Is Turkey Preparing to Replace US Military Base in
ARABIYA
ENGLISH
(Mar.
18,
2018),
Qatar?
AL
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/views/news/middle-east/2018/03/18/Turkeycements-economic-ties-with-military-base-in-Qatar.html (on Turkey’s two military
bases in Qatar and its 2022 military plan to deploy more troops and establish a naval
base in Qatar); Suraj Sharma, ANALYSIS: A Quandary for Qatar, and a Global Crisis
EAST
EYE
(July
4,
2017),
in
the
Making,
MIDDLE
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-qatar-crisis-military-diplomacyeconomy-689636344 (discussing the problematizing significance of Turkish soldiers
in Qatar as a hedge against any attempt to topple the Qatari leadership).
85
IMF ranks Qatar as the world’s richest country. See Will Martin, Ranked:
The 29 Richest Countries in The World, BUS. INSIDER (May 22, 2018)
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-richest-countries-in-the-world-2018-5 (listing
Qatar as the richest country based on April 2018 IMF data).
86
Gabriel Collins, Anti-Qatar Embargo Grinds Toward Strategic Failure, Issue
Brief, RICE U. BAKER INST. PUB. POL’Y 1–2 (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/99690/bi-brief-012218-cesqatarembargo.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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and coordinated policy responses to interferences in Lebanon, Syria,
Yemen, and Iraq.
While the political context appears frozen, the social,
economic, and security implications remain fluid. Qatar’s diplomatic
dexterity and world-wide investments have circumvented the
economic effects of isolation, 87 extended relations with Turkey,
adroitly managed affairs with Iran, repaired then strengthened ties to
the U.S., unbalanced Saudi Arabia’s Gulf leadership, and leveraged the
platform of the ICJ to publicize its victimization. 88 Before the
blockade, Qatar cultivated its role as mediator and outmaneuvered
Saudi Arabia and Turkey to create a diplomatic outpost for the Taliban,
establishing Doha as a safe haven hub for high-level discussions and
peace talks. 89 Qatar’s projection of a triangulated foreign policy
fundamentally balances Saudi Arabian, Iranian, and the United States
interactions. Qatar has added complexity to its geostrategic station by
discussing the purchase of a Russian missile defense system; 90 a move
87 See Qatar: 2018 Article IV Consultation-Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement
by the Executive Director for Qatar, IMF STAFF COUNTRY REP. (May 30, 2018),
http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2018/05/30/Qatar-2018Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-theExecutive-45915 (noting Qatar’s economy continues to successfully adjust despite
the diplomatic rift).
88
On Qatar’s portrayal “as a victim of Saudi perfidy” and the increasing
view in the Arab world that the anti-Qatar quartet represents an autocratic conspiracy
against political change, see Hassan, supra note 29.
89
The establishment of a diplomatic channel of communication with the
Taliban in Qatar has facilitated the interests of Pakistan and Afghanistan, NATO,
and has assisted in discussions involving Guantanamo Bay prisoner exchanges and
the release of U.S. Sgt. Robert “Bowe” Bergdahl from Taliban captivity. See How
Qatar
Came
to
Host
the
Taliban,
BBC
(June
23,
2013),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-23007401. Bergdahl was released in May
2014 in exchange for five Guantanamo Bay captives released to Qatari
intermediaries. See also Eric Schmitt & Charlie Savage, Bowe Bergdahl, American Soldier,
Freed by Taliban in Prisoner Trade, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2014)
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/bowe-bergdahl-american-soldier-isfreed-by-taliban.html.
90 See Qatar In Talks with Russia Over S-400 Missile Defense System Purchase,
DEFENSE
ADVOC.
ALLIANCE
(July
10,
2018),
MISSILE
http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/other-news/qatar-in-talks-with-russia-over-s400-missile-defense-system-purchase/ (noting missile purchase discussions between
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that would run counter to the interoperable air defense aspirations of
the GCC. Saudi Arabia has threatened a military response. 91
Long-term implications of this blockade and expulsion extend
beyond the dynamics of regional politics. A central component of the
Gulf economy is its migrant work force. 92 Migrant workers far
outnumber the indigenous population in the region’s smaller
countries. 93 Migrant communities and governments such as India that
supply manual and domestic workers to the Gulf States have crucial
interests at stake. 94 The migrant worker economy is regarded among
the world’s most important global poverty-fighting institutions, 95
notwithstanding well-known abuses involving visa-trading and human
Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and Russian President, Vladimir
Putin).
91 See Benjamin Barthe, L’Arabie saoudite menace le Qatar d’une “action militaire”
s’il se dote de missiles S-400, LE MONDE (June 1, 2018),
https://mobile.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2018/06/01/l-arabie-saouditemenace-le-qatar-de-represailles-militaires-s-il-se-dote-de-missiles-s400_5308285_3218.html?xtref=.
92 See generally Andrzej Kapiszewski, Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the
GCC Countries, in SOUTH ASIAN MIGRATION TO GULF COUNTRIES: HISTORY,
POLICIES, DEVELOPMENT 46–70 (Prakash C. Jain & Gina Zacharia Oommen eds.,
2016) (noting the economic significance of remittances and the general support for
such emigration by Gulf States).
93
According to the ILO, migrant workers make up the majority of the
population in Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, and over 95 percent of the
domestic and construction work forces of Gulf States. Migrant workers account for
more than 80 percent of the population in Qatar and the UAE. See generally Labour
Migration, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/labourmigration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
94 See generally Muhammad Azhar, Indian Migrant Workers in GCC Countries, 9
DIASPORA STUD. 100–11 (2016) (on the post-1973 oil era influx of millions of Indian
migrants in GCC countries and the impact on the Indian economy). See also Jo
Jakobsen & Marko Valenta, Moving to the Gulf: An Empirical Analysis of the Patterns and
Drivers of Migration to the GCC Countries, 1960–2013, 57 LABOR HIST. 627, 630 (2016)
(noting “[a]lmost half of the total emigrant stock from India, which is by far the
largest migrant-sending country in South Asia, is received by the GCC” and that the
GCC hosts over 21 million migrants from the top 25 migrant-sending countries).
95 See Omar Al-Ubaydli, The Economics of Migrant Workers in the GCC, ARAB
GULF
ST.
INST.
WASH.
3
(2015),
https://agsiw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/12/Omar-Al-Ubaydli_Economic-Migrants_PDF2.pdf
(citing research from the World Bank and the U.N. Global Commission on
International Migration).
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trafficking. 96 The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) has
reported that the Arab States region contains among the world’s
highest proportions of manual and domestic migrant communities, 97
putting pressure on labor supply states to choose sides in the dispute
or disengage by reducing nationals’ exposure to increasing regional
insecurities. 98 Since the initiation of the blockade, Qatar has moved to
quiet concerns about its treatment of migrant workers and improve its
much criticized kafala (sponsorship) system, which prevented migrant
workers from fleeing abusive employer practices. 99 Criticisms of the
kafala system are “Gulf wide,” and an array of potential reforms in
Qatar may add significant pressure to ILO attempts to end exploitative
labor systems in the region. 100
Of the legal and human rights violations alleged in this
upcoming dispute at the ICJ, this Article focuses on general issues
See id. at 12–15 (citing visa-trading (where migrants are sponsored for a
specific position but forced to perform a different job on arrival) and other forms of
human smuggling and migrant worker abuse). See also Ali Assareh Mahmood
Monshipouri, Migrant Workers and Their Rights in the United Arab Emirates, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FRAMEWORKS, GOALS, AND STRATEGIES 227–243
(Mahmood Monshipouri ed., 2011) (discussing regional and country-specific
practices and labor conditions affecting migrant workers).
97 See Labour Migration, supra note 93 (noting in 2015 that there were 32
million international migrants in the Arab States region).
98 See Naser Al-Tamimi, The Gulf Crisis: Why is India Still Neutral? ARAB NEWS
(July 29, 2017), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1136101/columns (noting that
the GCC was India’s largest trading partner in 2016, with the UAE and Saudi Arabia
among India’s top five partners, and that Qatar provided India with almost 19
percent of its crude energy imports and 62 percent of its natural gas imports); Zahraa
Alkhalisi & Rishi Iyengar, Philippines Stops Sending Workers to Qatar, CNNMONEY
(June 6, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/06/06/news/economy/qatarmigrant-workers-philippines/index.html (assessing reactions of Qatari migrant
worker supply states, including the Philippines, India, Nepal, and Egypt).
99 See G.B.331/INS/13(Rev.), Governing Body, INT’L LABOR OFF. (Oct. 31,
2017),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_586479.pdf
(on
complaints
concerning non-observance by Qatar of labor standards and general agreements to
be taken to rectify the situation).
100 See Qatar: Implementation Will be Key for Labor Reforms, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/27/qatar-implementationwill-be-key-labor-reforms (discussing kafala reforms and the impact for the region).
Bahrain terminated the kafala system in 2009.
96
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surrounding the expulsion of aliens, 101 with specific concentration on
the implications for Gulf State relations regardless of a judgment from
the ICJ. Qatar’s Foreign Minister claimed the suit presented “the first
step in bringing an end” to serious human rights abuses. 102 Even if his
sense of progress prevails through recourse to international law’s most
formal dispute settlement mechanism, the journey likely will be long
and the prospect of a Phyrric victory is high. However, the Emirati
Foreign Minister dismissed the petition as a deceit, adding that it only
escalated tensions. 103
Following this introduction, Part II briefly reviews the general
international law supporting migratory movements as associated with
the principle of hospitality and then discusses the international law
relating to expulsions. Part III assesses the benefits and obstacles of
removing this case from the ICJ’s docket to another, softer law
environment. For purposes here, soft law means “the ability to get
what you want through attraction rather than through coercion or
payments.” 104 Its usage redirects the understanding of influence away
from the formalities and structures of international law, as embodied
by the ICJ itself, toward a culture of decision-making that emphasizes
norm socialization, networks and forms of commitment broadly

101
For purposes here, expulsion is defined in line with the definition
proffered by Art. 2(a) of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the
Expulsion
of
Aliens,
with
Commentaries,
available
at
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_12_2014.pdf
[hereinafter 2014 Report] (“a formal act, or conduct consisting of an action or
omission, attributable to a State by which an alien is compelled to leave the territory
of that state . . . .”).
102 Qatar Says It Files Case Against UAE at UN’s Highest Court, N.Y. TIMES
(June
11,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/06/11/world/middleeast/ap-mlqatar.html (quoting Qatar’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman
Al Thani).
103 See Gargash: We’re Not Surprised by Qatar Lawsuit Given Hajj Lies, NATIONAL
(June 11, 2018), https://www.thenational.ae/world/gcc/gargash-we-re-notsurprised-by-qatar-lawsuit-given-hajj-lies-1.739057 (quoting Emirati Foreign
Minister Dr. Anwar Gargash).
104
Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, 119 POL. SCI. Q.
255, 256 (2004).

24

Game of Thrones: The Qatar Crisis

2019

7:1

construed. 105 The irony of suggesting a route for dispute de-escalation
through recourse to the failed mechanisms that launched the dispute
onto the docket of the ICJ is obvious. However, soft power works on
multiple levels and often emerges from the “cavities” of
multilateralism to give expression to “power beneath the surface,” 106
particularly when discursive settings can return to a mission-centered
purpose for reestablishing relationships.
Qatar has deployed an array of soft power initiatives that
reform-minded Saudis may quietly envy. 107 It has positioned itself as a
voice of independent news in the Arab world, as a satellite of U.S.
higher education institutions, as a venue for the 2001 Doha Round of
WTO talks, the 2012 United Nations Climate Change Conference
(“COP 18”), the 2006 Asian Games, and the 2022 FIFA World Cup. 108
See Francesco Francioni, International ‘Soft Law’: A Contemporary Assessment,
in FIFTY YEARS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF SIR ROBERT JENNINGS 167, 167–68 (Vaughn Lowe & Malgosia Fitzmaurice eds.,
1996) (noting the operation of soft law outside of the system of formal sources that
are nevertheless capable of producing legal effects); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 423 (noting
that “soft law facilitates compromise, and thus mutually beneficial cooperation,
between actors with different interests and values, different time horizons and
discount rates, and different degrees of power”).
106
PETER VAN HAM, SOCIAL POWER IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 3
(“power beneath the surface”), 70 (“cavities” of multilateralism) (2010).
107
The new Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman has launched a
series of anti-corruption and moderate Islam reforms that have suggested the crown
prince already has undertaken “[t]he most significant reform process . . . anywhere
in the Middle East today”. Thomas L. Friedman, Saudi Arabia’s Arab Spring, at Last,
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2017),
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/opinion/saudi-prince-mbs-arabspring.html. For criticisms of Friedman’s opinion of bin Salman’s transformative
intent, see Filkins, supra note 54.
108 See ROBERTS, supra note 30, at 1, 3, 11, and ch. 8. On the movement away
from an Egyptian-influenced education system to a more western curricula in the
Gulf region, see Maher Kelifa, Trading Culture: Have Western-Educated Emirati Females
Gone Western? 1 OIDA INT’L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 19 (2010). Georgetown
University, Texas A&M, Northwestern University, Carnegie Mellon University,
University of Calgary, and Virginia Commonwealth University have established
campuses in Qatar. See Education in Doha Qatar, ONLINEQATAR,
https://www.onlineqatar.com/education/universities-qatar.aspx (last visited Sept.
23, 2018).
105
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A unique and intra-elite sense of cohesion, combined with its geostrategic station between competing global interests, shape Qatar into
“its own variety of a developmental state.” 109 Such a distinction adds
complexity in the Arab world, where the world’s only major ruling
monarchs reside. 110
Qatar’s exercise of subtle power and influence might indicate
a shift of the center of gravity in the Arab world toward the Persian
Gulf. 111 However, this crisis is as much a consequential loss of social
cohesion or group feeling (asabîyah) of the Gulf States, as expressed by
the great fourteenth century Berber philosopher, Ibn Khaldûn in the
prolegomena to his meditation on the rise and fall of great dynasties. 112
There, he presented a generational stage theory of development that
explained the rise and fall of the dynastic state. 113 Khaldûn drew
attention to social facts and common circumstances that informed
state creation and interaction in ways that continued to influence
contemporary relations. 114 With adept soft power experience, Qatar
should recognize that any reclamation of constructive discourse is
more likely to follow from informal means of dispute settlement from
within the GCC and its emerging generational leadership change, 115 if
MEHRAN KAMRAVA, QATAR A: SMALL STATE, BIG POLITICS 167 (2013).
Lisa Anderson, Absolutism and the Resiliency of Monarchy in the Middle East,
106 POL. SCI. Q. 1 (1991).
111 See KAMRAVA, supra note 109, at 165.
112 See IBN KHALDÛN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO
HISTORY lxi, 15–68 (Franz Rosenthal trans., Princeton University Press 1967) (1377).
On the translation of asabîyah, see id. at lxi. Khaldûn associated the loss of asabîya with
dynastic decline: “as a rule no dynasty lasts beyond the life (span) of three
generations.” Id. at 343. Transliterated spellings of the term vary, although it also
commonly appears in English as asabiyyah.
113 See id. at 353–55 (discussing stages of success, consolidation of royal
authority, leisure and tranquility, contentment and peacefulness, and waste and
squandering).
114 See Sema Yilmaz Genç, An Evaluation of Ibni Khaldun’s Thoughts of the
Economical World, in 2 GLOBALIZATION DIMENSIONS & IMPACTS: GLOBAL STUDIES,
47 (Hilal Yildiz, Farhang Morady & Ismail Șiriner eds., 2015) (on Khaldûn’s
historiographic and sociological significance).
115 See Becca Wasser & Jeff Martini, The Next Generation of Gulf Leaders,
FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persiangulf/2016-02-14/next-generation-gulf-leaders (noting the emergence of Gulf crown
princes and key ministers who are in their 30s, 40, and 50s).
109
110
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it is able to reconstitute a bond of asabîyah. Although possible, such a
solution appears remote, except in view of alternatives. Part IV draws
conclusions about how a change of forum may mute the consequences
of an Arab predicament that portages the internecine strife of a region
to a forum likely to render judgment in favor of Qatar.
II. HOSPITALITY AND EXPULSION
The western legal tradition regards migration as a “permanent
feature.” 116 The customary law of nations construed hospitality to
include habituated and recognized rules governing the legal status of
aliens, strangers, and their right of movement and communication. 117
Migration is an equally well-understood feature of Arabia, where the
Haj pilgrimage to Mecca historically supported the frankincense
caravan routes and traditions of nomadic grazing migrations. 118 PreIslamic Bedouins regarded hospitality as “central to a noble character”
and the three great monotheistic religions regard as virtuous the
hospitable treatment of moving populations. 119
Although supported in political and international literature, the
treatment of strangers has become a “social problem on a global
Vincent Chetail, Sovereignty and Migration in the Doctrine of the Law of Nations:
An Intellectual History of Hospitality from Vitoria to Vattel, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 901, 902
(2016) (noting the law of nations’ symbiotic relationship with migration “from its
inception.”).
117 See generally id. (canvassing opinions of classical western thinkers,
including Cicero, Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattel). But see Nan
Seuffert, Queering International Law’s Stories of Origin: Hospitality and Homophobia, in
QUEERING INTERNATIONAL LAW: POSSIBILITIES, ALLIANCES, COMPLICITIES,
RISKS 213–35 (Dianne Otto ed., 2017) (investigating the allegorical significance of
hospitality as employed by Vitoria and the sixteenth-century Spanish imperial rule of
Mesoamerica). See generally GEORG CAVALLAR, THE RIGHTS OF STRANGERS:
THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL HOSPITALITY, THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY, AND
POLITICAL JUSTICE SINCE VITORIA (2002); J. Irizarry y Puente, Exclusion and
Expulsion of Aliens in Latin America, 36 AM. J. INT’L L. 252 (1942) (detailing the
historical tolerance of domiciled aliens throughout Latin America).
118 See generally Migrant Workers in the Arab Middle East, 4 THIRD WORLD Q.
530 (1982).
119
Mona Siddiqui, Welcoming in God’s Name: Hospitality in Islam and Christianity,
&
ETHICS
(Jan.
5,
2017),
RELIGION
http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2017/01/05/4600525.htm.
116
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scale,” 120 particularly in terms of challenges to refugee law. 121 Hannah
Arendt traced the modern origins of the problem to the massive spatial
disorientation caused by the Great War. 122 The disassociation of
persons from the protective sphere of the state compromised persons’
political status, 123 creating a legal lacauna or rightless anomaly by which,
through expulsion, a country could diminish its “burden of
indésirables.” 124 As Arendt concluded, “[t]he world found nothing
sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human.” 125
Postcolonial theorists, such as Edward Said, assigned to human
migration a supreme importance “attendant upon war, colonialism and
decolonization, economic and political revolution, and such
devastating occurrences as famine, ethnic cleansing, and great power
machinations.” 126 Recent challenges to refugee law among states of the
Mediterranean region and Southeast Europe, has spawned a
reexamination of restrictions on mass migration for reasons of national

120
Nicholas Onuf, Relative Strangers: Reflections on Hospitality, Social Distance and
Diplomacy, in HOSPITALITY AND WORLD POLITICS 173 (Gideon Baker ed., 2013)
(noting wide-ranging philosophical and political treatments of hospitality from Kant
to Derrida).
121 See, e.g., Filippo Grandi, Protecting Refugees in Europe and Beyond: Can the EU
Rise to the Challenge? U.N. HUM. RTS. COMMISSION (Dec. 5, 2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/admin/hcspeeches/58456ec34/protecting-refugeeseurope-beyond-eu-rise-challenge.html (referring to the mass migration influx of
refugees arriving across Europe beginning in 2015 from the Mediterranean Sea or
overland through Southeast Europe); Donald Kerwin, The Faltering US Refugee
Protection System: Legal and Policy Responses to Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Others in Need
of Protection, 21 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 1, (2012); Todd Scribner, You Are Not Welcome
here Anymore: Restoring Support for Refugee Resettlement in the Age of Trump, 5 J. MIG. &
HUM. STUD. 263 (2017) (assessing the Trump Administration’s migration policy).
122 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 268–75
(1951) (discussing statelessness as the newest mass phenomenon caused by the
internal disintegration of World War I).
123 See id. at 295 (“Only the loss of a polity itself expels [a person] from
humanity.”).
124 Id. at 281.
125 Id. at 295.
126
EDWARD W. SAID, REFLECTIONS ON EXILE AND OTHER ESSAYS xiv
(2000).
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security in Europe. 127 Migration policy and unsecured borders are now
signature issues in U.S. political and legal discourse, as well. 128
A. Expulsion and the Fear of Terrorism
The circumstances surrounding the Qatari expulsions add
another dimension to debates on international migration. Actions
taken by the UAE against Qatari residents assert no connection to
historical stateless classifications of Heimatlosen or apatrides—persons
who (in the post-World War I millieu of Europe) “would not or could
not assume the nationality of a successor state.” 129 They do not
comport with traditionally understood explanatory economic
migration theories. 130 The UAE’s actions also fall outside the bounds
of belligerent occupation, as the UAE is not an occupying power
within the meaning of Geneva Convention IV relative to the
Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of War. 131 Additionally, they
make no claim connected to refugee status, non-refoulement, illegal entry,
or itemized illegal activity. The sweeping generality of the UAE
127 Migrant Crisis: European Commission Proposes Asylum Reforms, BBC (Apr. 6,
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35974982 (noting European
Commission response to the mass influx of refugees across Europe beginning in
2015).
128 See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (holding constitutional
a presidential proclamation upholding entry restrictions on specific foreign state
aliens into the United States on legitimate national security grounds). See also Sarah
Pierce & Andrew Selee, Immigration Under Trump: A Review of Policy Shifts in the Year
POL’Y
INST.
(Dec.
2017),
Since
the
Election,
MIGRATION
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/immigration-under-trump-reviewpolicy-shifts (discussing political objectives to cut legal immigration and reshape the
entry of foreign-born workers to the U.S.) (last visited Sept. 23, 2018).
129
MICHAEL R. MARRUS, THE UNWANTED: EUROPEAN REFUGEES IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 70 (1985).
130
See BOGUMIL TERMINSKI, DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT
AND RESETTLEMENT: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 5
(2013) (explaining migration decisions in terms of wage differences (the Hicks
Model), rural-urban dichotomy (the Harris-Todaro Model), stages of development
(the Zelinsky Model), or positive/negative, push-pull factors (Everett Lee’s PushPull theory).
131 See JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 143–78 (1995) (on Geneva Convention IV
and the issue of deportation of enemy civilians during belligerent occupation).
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measures add confusion, if not pretext, to emerging views regarding
possible remediation efforts to combat state-sponsored terrorism, and
call into mind the infamous 1944 United States Supreme Court
decision upholding the internment of United States citizens of mostly
Japanese descent during World War II. 132
Since the events of 9/11, international law has concentrated on
balancing the protection of human rights and the prevention of
terrorism. 133 Liberal state responses to the challenges of terrorism
presented a multipronged intermix of political, law enforcement, and
military actions, 134 which prompted criticisms of the inability of the
liberal state to protect democratic notions of freedom and core secular
values. 135 Important examples in U.S. constitutional history have
upheld national security restrictions on individual liberties, including
the rights of citizens. 136 On balance, “restrictions on individual liberties
. . . have been upheld in the context of national security imperatives

132 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (justifying a
presidential executive order to intern Japanese Americans based on national security
notwithstanding application of the Equal Protection Clause’s strict judicial scrutiny
standard for race-based classifications). In Trump v. Hawaii, the majority seemingly
overruled Korematsu, (C.J. Roberts noting the decision “was gravely wrong” and
“has no place in law under the [c]onstitution” even though the majority noted that
“Korematsu ha[d] nothing to do with this case.”). See Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2423.
133 See Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, Fact Sheet No. 32, OFF.
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
HUM.
RTS.,
at
19
(2008),
U.N.
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Factsheet32EN.pdf.
134 See PAUL WILKINSON, TERRORISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY: THE LIBERAL
STATE RESPONSE chs. 4–6 (2d ed. 2006). See generally Cynthia Banham, The Torture of
Citizens After 9/11: Liberal Democracies, Civil Society and the Domestic Context, 20 INT’L J.
HUM. RTS. 914 (2016).
135 See Orlando Patterson, Freedom and 9/11, 21 DEMOCRACY: A JOURNAL
OF IDEAS (2011), https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/22/freedom-and-911/.
136 See, e.g., Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65–24, 40 State 217 (repealed
1948); Sedition Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65–150, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921); Alien
Registration Act of 1940 [Smith Act], Pub. L. 76–670, 54 Stat 670 (repealed 1950);
and various forms of emergency legislation, including, National Emergencies Act of
2000, 50 U.S.C. § 1621; International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
[IEEPA], Pub. L. 95–223, 91 Stat. 1626 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 17011706 (2000)); USA Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272.
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. . . that would likely not have been permitted absent such
justifications.” 137
Responses from the Arab world noted the fitful liberal
reactions, described generically by the former deputy director of the
International Crisis Group’s Middle East branch as the flailing of a
“blinded Cyclops.” 138 The inability of western states to frame a
synthetic and coherent response to terrorism stimulated the subaltern
reorientation within the Arabian Peninsula world toward its own
assessment of threats to security—sectarian conflicts between Shiite
and Sunnis and challenges to monarchic rule stemming from the Arab
Spring. 139
In a continuing display of confused and cross-purpose foreign
policy, the Trump administration initially presented a mixed message
on the Qatari crisis. 140 Secretary of State Tillerson expressed sympathy
for Qatar in the face of the Saudi-led boycott in 2017, whereas
President Trump declared Qatar a “funder of terror at a very high
level.” 141 President Trump then reversed his position and described
Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and
the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 675, 698 (2004)
(reviewing U.S. case law and balancing tests employed by courts to acquiesce, defer,
or steer clear of ripeness or political questions involving executive judgments on
restrictions of liberty during ongoing national security imperatives).
138
Joost Hilterman, Deep Traumas, Fresh Ambitions, in LEGACIES OF THE
IRAN-IRAQ WAR (Middle East Research and Information Project, Spring 2018),
https://www.merip.org/mer/mer257/deep-traumas-fresh-ambitions (specifically
noting U.S. policy since the 2003 invasion of Iraq). See MADAWI AL-RASHEED, A
HISTORY OF SAUDI ARABIA xiii (2d ed. 2010) (on the impact of 9/11 and sectarian
concerns in Saudi Arabia).
139 See Borzou Daragahi, 9/11 from Arab Shores, FOR. POL’Y (Sept. 2011),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/09/911-from-arab-shores/.
140 See Robert Malley & Jon Finer, Fixing Trump’s Blunders on Qatar, WASH.
POST
(June
9,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/globalopinions/wp/2017/06/09/fixing-trumps-blunders-onqatar/?utm_term=.560f684c8186 (calling U.S. mixed messages “head-spinning”).
141
Peter Baker, Trump Now Sees Qatar as an Ally Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/world/middleeast/trumpqatar-terrorism.html (quoting President Trump). Conflicting reports have emerged
about whether the Saudis and Emiratis would have launched the blockade without
prior approval from the White House. See Filkins, supra note 54 (quoting a former
137
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Qatar as a partner in the fight against extremism. 142 At the same time,
Qatar announced plans to double its investments in the U.S. to $250
billion. 143
Either display sublimated direct consideration of the
underlying expulsion issue. Executed with due process and mindful of
individual circumstances, the expulsion of aliens is a long and
established, but not absolute, sovereign right of states. 144 The
International Law Commission’s (“ILC”) Draft Articles on the
U.S. intelligence officer who claimed the White House “gave the green light” and a
senior administration official, who denied the claim).
142 See id. (noting the “remarkable turnaround” in US policy toward Qatar).
143 See David A. Patten, Qatar’s Emir Promises To Step Up Ties, Invest $250 Billion
in US, NEWSMAX (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/emirtamim-qatar-donald-trump-middle-east/2018/04/13/id/854468/ (noting President
Trump more recently called the Qataris “great friends” as its emir promised to
double trade and investment with the US, including a possible $10 billion partnership
with Exxon to develop U.S. shale oil deposits, the purchase of a $300 million guided
missiles system, $18 billion in additional investments in the U.S. by 2020, a $1.7 Qatar
Airways letter of intent to purchase fighter jets from Boeing, and possible investment
projects in Florida, Texas, South Carolina, and Washington, D.C.).
144 See Expulsion of Aliens in International Human Rights Law (OHCHR
Discussion
Paper,
Sept.
2006),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/migration/taskforce/docs/Discussionpaper-expulsions.pdf (recognizing the qualified right of states to regulate the
presence of foreigners on their territory); C-143—Migrant Workers (Supplementary
Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143), adopted June 24, 1975, INT’L LABOUR ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100
_ILO_CODE:C143#A13 (recognizing expulsion in accordance with individual
safeguards). See also Jorge Bustamante (Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of
Migrants), Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 64, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/12
(Feb. 25, 2008) (affirming due process treatment on individual bases for irregular
migrants and those persons involved in interceptions at sea). Doctrinal references to
the right of expulsion abound. See, e.g., Irizarry y Puente, supra note 117, at 257 (noting
in Latin America the right to remain “is a privilege” subject to law); PATRICK
DAILLER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 664 (Paris: L.G.D.J.
1999) (noting the right is generally recognized); Lawrence Preuss, International Law
and Deprivation of Nationality, 23 GEO. L.J. 250, 272 (1934) (affirming the right to expel
aliens is not in doubt); HENCKAERTS, supra note 131, at 45 (indirectly acknowledging
the right except when violative of “non-discrimination principle”); Lamin Jalamang
Sisi, Expulsion of Aliens in International Law: Some African Case Studies 84-85
(doctoral dissertation, Johns Hopkins, 1975) (confirming the right to expel).
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Expulsion of Aliens (2014), recognized a general right of states to expel
aliens from their territory, but only “in accordance with . . . other
applicable rules of international law, in particular those relating to
human rights.” 145 The Draft Article’s specific reference to human
rights assumed a respect for human rights that necessarily arises from
expulsion cases. This justification, if not derived from treaty law, finds
support in general rules prohibiting arbitrariness, abuse of rights, and
denial of justice. 146 Case law and state practice support consideration
of procedural due regard, as discussed below.
For example, in the Maal Case, an early twentieth century
arbitration between the Netherlands and Venezuela, “large
discretionary powers” inhered in the right of a state to expel “in a
proper and lawful manner” persons “dangerous to the welfare of the
country.” 147 In the 1980s, the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal noted
that international law guaranteed “certain procedural and substantive
minimum standards” even though a state had “wide discretion” to
expel foreigners. 148 Security Council Resolution 1456 (2003) reflected
the mix of legal factors involved in expulsion cases, including
international criminal and humanitarian law, refugee law, and human
rights law, and these considerations stand behind the Council’s
conclusion that “[s]tates must ensure that any measure taken to combat
terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law.” 149
If done en masse, problems arise. 150

145
Art. 3, Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries.
International
Law
Commission
A/69/10
(Nov.
11,
2014),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_12_2014.pdf.
146 See id. cmt. (2).
147
Maal Case, Mixed Claims Commission, Netherlands-Venezuela, June 1,
1903, X UNRIAA 730, 731.
148
Yeager v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran United States Claims
Tribunal, Award of Nov. 2, 1987, 17 IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL REP. 92, 106.
149
S.C. Res 1456, ¶ 6 (Jan. 23, 2003), https://documents-ddsny.un.org/doc/undoc/GEN/N03/216/05/PDF/N0321605.pdf?OpenElement.
150 See JULIA WOJNOWSKA-RADZIŃSKA, THE RIGHT OF AN ALIEN TO BE
PROTECTED AGAINST ARIBITRARY EXPULSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2015)
(citing the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Non-Citizens’ report on
collective expulsion of aliens).
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Collective Expulsion and Countervailing UAE and Qatari
Arguments

The UAE argued that its case was not about racial
discrimination based on “national origin” but about lawful measures
against the State of Qatar, not its nationals. 151 The UAE objected to
the application of the Convention, arguing that “the preconditions for
the seisin of the Court” were never fulfilled.” 152 Qatar summarized the
UAE’s actions as “measures that purposefully target[ed] and infringe[d]
the rights of Qataris protected under the Convention on the basis of their
national origin.” 153
Article 5 of CERD requires states parties to guarantee
the equal enjoyment of basic human rights to all, regardless of race or
national origin. 154 Article 2 of the Convention obligates states to
eliminate racial discrimination. 155 According to the Convention’s
travaux preparatoires, the articles, taken together, “[e]nsure that noncitizens are not subject to collective expulsion, in particular situations
where there are insufficient guarantees that the personal circumstance
of each of the persons concerned have been taken into account.” 156
Initially, expulsion related to the forced removal of persons
across a state boundary. The late Cherif Bassiouni, a leading authority
on international criminal law, noted that the prohibition of deportation
now includes forced population transfers applied to the “compulsory
movement of people from one area to another within the same
State.” 157 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) statute includes
Qatar v. UAE, Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record CR 2018/15,
Friday, June 29, 2018, at 4:30 pm, at 3 (Mr. Pellet) https://www.icj-cij.org/files/caserelated/172/172-20180729-ORA-02-01-BI.pdf.
152 Id. at 4.
153
Qatar v. UAE, Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record CR 2018/12,
Wednesday, June 27 2018, at 10 am, at 34 (Ms. Amirfar) (emphasis in original).
154 See CERD, art. 5, supra note 3.
155 See id., art. 2.
156
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation XXX on Discrimination Against Non-Citizens, UN doc.
CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), ¶ 26.
157
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 312 (2d rev. ed, 1999).
151
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among its definition of crimes against humanity “deportation or
forcible transfer of population.” 158 The ILC Draft Articles define
expulsion to mean “a formal act or conduct attributable to a State by
which an alien is compelled to leave the territory of that State.” 159
Exceptions include extradition, surrender to an international criminal
court or tribunal, or the non-admission of an alien to a state. 160
Distinctions arise with regard to persons unlawfully present in a
territory 161 and to refugees. 162 However, the Draft Articles “move
beyond the national laws of many states and the European Union” by
covering aliens regardless of whether they entered the state legally. 163
158
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art 7(1)(d), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, (entered into force July 1, 2002). The Statute defines deportation
or forcible transfer of population to mean “forced displacement of the persons
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are
lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law.” See id. art.
7(2)(d). Unlawful deportations or transfers are also classified as war crimes. See id.
art. 8(2)(a)(vii). The ICC also establishes “persecution” as a separate crime against
humanity—if done against an identifiable national group on grounds impermissible
under international law. See id. art. 7(1)(h). Deportation has been recognized as a
crime against humanity in each of the major international criminal instruments prior
to the ICC, including the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, the Allied Control
Council Law No. 10, and the statutes of the international criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The long-standing definition of “deportation” as a
crime against humanity included the crime of forced population transfer within a
state’s borders.
159
Art. 2, 2014 Report, supra note 101, at 4.
160 Id.
161
For various conventional treatments of lawful or irregular aliens, see
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 13, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 14668 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976); Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. 32, July 28, 1951,189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954)
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, adopted on Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117 (entered into force June 6, 1960)
(various declarations and reservations); Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness art. 31, Aug. 31, 1961, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975).
162 See Refugee Convention, supra note 161.
163
Sean D. Murphy, The Expulsion of Aliens and Other Topics: The Sixty-Fourth
Session of the International Law Commission, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 164, 165–66 (2013).
Important human rights conventions do differentiate between lawful aliens and
unlawful aliens on matters of expulsion. See Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Art. 32, July 28, 1951, 189 UNTS 150; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Art. 13, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171 [hereinafter ICCPR];
European Convention on Establishment, Art. 3, Dec. 13, 1955, ETS No. 19,
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In line with established international law, the Draft Articles preserve
the extraterritorial prohibition of refoulement, which protects refugees
from returning to frontiers of territories where they have a wellfounded fear of persecution based on a limited set of considerations. 164
No contracting state shall return (“refouler”) a refugee to the frontier
territories where life or freedom would be threatened. 165
ii. Individual Assessment of Circumstance
The expulsion of aliens as a group egregiously disregards the
individual assessment of circumstance, as specifically required in
several international human rights treaties and the Draft Articles. 166
available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ 019.htm;
American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 22(6), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 UNTS 123,
9 ILM 673 (1970), as amended by protocols of Nov. 14, 1988, 28 ILM 156, and June
8, 1990, 29 ILM 1447; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 12(4),
June 27, 1981, 21 ILM 58 (1982); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 26, May 22,
2004, reprinted in 12 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005).
164
Art. 6(b), 2014 Report, supra note 101, at 10. See also Refugee Convention,
supra note 161, art. 1(A)(2) (“owing to [a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion”).
165
Refugee Convention, supra note 161, art. 33(1). See also European
Convention of Human Rights (Protocol 4) art. 3, E.T.S. No. 46 (1963); non-refoulement
is implicit in art. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“no one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). The
Human Rights Committee, likewise, has interpreted art. 7 of the ICCPR as
prohibiting expulsion where there is a risk of torture. See General Comment No.
20/44, ¶ 9, Apr. 3, 1992. The Committee on the Rights of the Child adopted a
General Comment on unaccompanied and separated children outside their country
of origin, noting such children should not be returned “where there are substantial
grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm.” See General
Comment No. 6, ¶ 27, Sept. 1, 2005. See also Convention Against Torture art. 3, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987), (applying to every such person regardless
of threats to public security).
166 See art. 9, 2014 Report, supra note 101, at 14 (Prohibition of collective
expulsion) and cmt. (1) (citing the International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (art. 22(1)), the
American Convention on Human Rights (art. 22(9)), the European Convention on
Human Rights (art. 4, Protocol No. 4), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights (art. 12(5)), and the Arab Charter on Human Rights (art. 26(2)). See also art. 4,
2014 Report, supra note 101, at 6 (holding that “[a]n alien may be expelled only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law.”).
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Case law before the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) adds
to the well-established definition of collective expulsion; such action
precludes any measure taken by a competent authority to compel aliens
as a group to leave a country, except where taken after and on the basis
of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular cases of
each individual alien of the group. 167 In the ECHR, the term “aliens”
refers to persons lawfully residing, domiciled or merely passing
through a country. 168 The focal point of review in these circumstances
relate generally to a determination that the applicant runs a real risk of
suffering ill-treatment if returned. 169
The UAE’s actions circumvent the persecution trigger
mechanism for the application of the refoulement prohibition. Qataris
express no fear of returning to their own government. However,
assessments relating to persons subject to expulsion (ratione personae)
and to the measures of expulsion (ratione materiae) depend on a
reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each
individual alien. 170 With no specific allegation of criminality or
wrongdoing, the weight of evidence indicates that international law
prohibits the UAE’s collective expulsions, 171 or that the UAE is
See, e.g., Andric v. Sweden, application no. 45917/99, ECtHR (relating to
Art. 4 of Protocol No. 4—Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens).
168 See Case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, application no. 27765/09,
ECtHR (2012) (involving the interception of Somali and Eritrean nationals and
disembarkation to Libya by Italian naval authorities).
169 See Hilal v. United Kingdom, application no. 45276/99, sec. 60 ECRH
2011-II; See also Irizarry y Puente, supra note 117, at 264–67 (reviewing national
security expulsion factors from Latin American history).
170 See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fifty-Ninth Session (7 May–5 June
and 9 July–10 August 2007), ¶ 199 n. 400, U.N. Doc. A/62/10 (2007) (prohibition
of collective expulsion); ILC Drafting Committee, Progress Report on the topic ‘Expulsion
L.
COMMISSION
(July
24,
2009),
of
Aliens,’
INT’L
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_12.shtml.
171 See art. 5(2), 2014 ILC Draft Articles, supra note 101, at 8 (“A State may
only expel an alien on a ground that is provided for by law”); art. 19(1) of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Collective expulsions are
prohibited); art. 22(9) American Convention on Human Rights; art. 26(2), Arab
Charter on Human Rights; art. 12(5), African Convention on Human and Peoples’
Rights [prohibiting mass expulsions aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious
groups]; and art. 25, Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
167

37

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

2019

7:1

attempting to fabricate a national emergency shield or derogation from
immigration practices. While the Draft Articles provide for expulsion
“on grounds of national security or public order,” 172 and preclude
collective expulsions except for “enemy aliens in the context of an
armed conflict,” 173 “any form of disguised expulsion of an alien is
prohibited.” 174 Disguised expulsions contemplate constructive
expulsions, which apply to methods of expulsion that shade the
adoption of a decision to expel, 175 or, to actions intended to infringe
the human rights of the alien in question. 176 Furthermore, the Draft
Articles preclude expulsions that are “arbitrary” or “punitive in
nature.” 177
National security derogation clauses tend to hinge on one or a
combination of four factors, including: (1) a sudden and unforeseen
emergency of unknown duration; (2) the potential gravity of the
emergent situation as dangerous or life threatening; (3) the
pronouncement by an official acting under the color of state authority;
and (4) the necessity and immediacy of a response. 178 Sean Murphy
noted that “several major human rights instruments set forth
obligations relating to expulsion, but also allow for derogations from
those obligations in time of emergency.” 179 The Refugee Convention,
for instance, subjects the prohibition against refoulement to exceptions
based on national security or public order. 180 However, even in these
circumstances, which do not apply here, and “[e]xcept where
compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, the refugee
shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear [themselves] and be
2014 Report, supra note 101, art.7, at 12.
Id. art. 9(4).
174 Id. art. 10(1).
175 Id. art. 10, cmt 1.
176 Id. art. 10, cmt 2.
177 Id. art 19(1)(a).
178
U.S. Congress, Senate Special Committee on the Termination of the
National Emergency, National Emergency, hearings, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., April 11–
12, 1973 (Washington: GPO, 1973), p. 277; See also Matti Pellonpää, Expulsion in
International Law: A Study in International Aliens Law and Human Rights with
Special Reference to Finland 86–93 (doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Law, University
of Helsinki, 1984) (on derogations that threaten the life of the nation).
179
Murphy, supra note 163, at 166.
180
Refugee Convention, supra note 161, at art. 32(1).
172
173
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represented before competent authority.” 181 More generally,
comparative international law reveals a variety of procedural measures
and guarantees attaching to the expulsion of aliens. 182 Grounds for
revoking procedural guarantees based on national security or public
order still require precise application in view of individual
circumstances. 183
B. A Minor and Major Problem
The history of expulsions found notable expressions in the
twentieth century with the turmoil and aftermath of two world wars. 184
Although framed in terms of western and central European diasporas,
other examples equally affected the Muslim world. In 1947, millions of
Muslims were expelled from India to Pakistan, while millions of
Hindus and Sikhs trekked in the opposite direction—all a consequence
of partitionment following British colonial rule. 185 Other exoduses
included the flight of 750,000 Palestinian Arabs in 1948, 186 the Algerian
exodus to Morocco and Tunisia in 1956, tribal diffusions due to
decades of war in Sudan, Muslim migrations due to strife in Bosnia in
1992, and other population dispersions due to the Gulf War, the

Id. art. 32(2).
See Wojnowska-Radzińska, supra note 150, ch. 4 (on the variety of
procedural guarantees against arbitrary expulsion, including issuance by a competent
authority, notice, audi alteram partem (the right to be heard), the right of appeal,
access to counsel).
183 See id. at 136–40.
184 See generally ARENDT, supra note 122; R. M. DOUGLAS, ORDERLY AND
HUMANE: THE EXPULSION OF THE GERMANS AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR
(2013). See also HENCKAERTS, supra note 131, at 1–2 (noting numerous historical
examples including the expulsion of Jews from England (1290) and Spain (1492),
Muslims from Spain (1610), Huguenots from France (1685), Protestants from
Salzburg (1731), French-Acadians from Nova Scotia (1755), the Cherokee Nation
from Georgia to Oklahoma (1835–1838), Armenians from the Ottoman Empire
(1915–1916), and Jews from Nazi Germany).
185
William Dalrymple, The Great Divide: The Violent Legacy of Indian Partition.,
YORKER
(June
29,
1015),
NEW
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/06/29/the-great-divide-booksdalrymple.
186
Dawn Chatty, The Duty to be Generous (Karam): Alternatives to Rights-Based
Asylum in the Middle East, 5 J. BRIT. ACAD. 177, 183 (2017).
181
182
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Kurdish diaspora, and the Arab Spring. 187 In 1990, Saudi Arabia
expelled one million Yemenis in response to the Sana’a government’s
support of Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. 188 More recently, the
Saudi kingdom launched another expulsion program after years of
consuming migrant labor. 189 Within a four-month period in 2013–
2014, Saudi Arabia expelled more than 160,000 Ethiopians. 190 Saudi
expulsions of Ethiopian and Yemini migrants eclipse significantly the
magnitude of the numbers involved in the Qatari case now before the
Khadija Elmadmad, An Arab Convention on Forced Migration: Desirability and
Possibilities, 3 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461, 462, 464, 480 (1991). Many demographic
separations and large-scale population transfers result as partitionments and remedies
for ethnic war; Ewa Tabeau & Jakub Bijak, War-Related Deaths in the 1992-1995
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results, 21
Eur. J. Population 187, 189–90 2005) (noting the “extraordinary migration and ethnic
cleansing of Bosnian muslims by Serbs); Patrick Kingsley, “Arab Spring Prompts
Biggest Migrant Wave Since Second World War,” Guardian (Jan. 3, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2015/jan/03/arab-springmigrant-wave-instability-war (noting mas migrations across much of the Arab world
due to spiraling instability since the Arab Spring). For an assessment in relation to
the propensity for violence, see generally Chaim D. Kaufmann, When All Else Fails:
Ethnic Population Transfers and Partitions in the Twentieth Century, 23 INT’L SECURITY 120
(1998).
188
Ian Black, Saudi Arabia Expels Thousands of Yemeni Workers, GUARDIAN
(Apr. 2, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/02/saudi-arabiaexpels-yemeni-workers.
189 See Felix Horne, Why Saudi Arabia Must Halt the Deportation of Half a Million
Ethiopians, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 24, 2017, 8:40 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/24/why-saudi-arabia-must-halt-deportationhalf-million-ethiopians; Bethan McKernan, Saudi Arabia ‘Deports 40,000 Pakistani
Workers Over Terror Fears’, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 13, 2017, 4:59 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-deports40000-pakistan-workers-terror-fears-attacks-counter-terrorism-a7578151.html. The
expulsion of Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia has been associated with the
recruitment efforts of the Houthi against anti-Saudi forces in the Yemen civil war.
See Bethan McKernan, Yemen Civil War: Saudi Expulsion of Yemeni Workers Swells Houthi
(Mar.
11,
2018,
11:41
PM),
Ranks,
INDEPENDENT
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-saudiarabia-houthi-yemeni-workers-expel-deport-fighters-recruitment-al-qaedaa8248506.html.
190 See Marina de Regt & Medareshaw Tafesse, Deported Before Experiencing the
Good Sides Of Migration: Ethiopians Returning From Saudi Arabia, 9 AFR. & BLACK
DIASPORA: INT’L J. 228, 229 (2015) (attributing the forced return of undocumented
migrants to the indirect destabilizing effects of the Arab Spring).
187
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Court. Additionally, Human Rights Watch reported that Pakistan
“pushed out nearly 365,000 of [its] 1.5 million registered Afghan
refugees [between 2014–2016], as well as just over 200,000 of the
country’s estimated [one] million undocumented Afghans.” 191 The UN
International Organization for Migration (“IOM”) reported that Iran
expelled 384,506 undocumented Afghans since January 2018. 192 In
2017–2018, attacks by Myanmar’s armed forces against Rohingya
Muslims pushed approximately 500,000 persons into to Bangladesh,
killing thousands of civilians in the process. 193 Mohammed Abdiker,
IOM director of operations and emergencies, categorically concluded
that, since the beginning of 2018, Saudi Arabia has returned 17,000
Yemenis to their war-torn homeland that Saudi Arabian bombings
forced them to flee. 194 On July 5, 2018, the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security partially extended its 2015 Temporary Protected
Status (“TPS”) for Yemenis based on “ongoing armed conflict” that
“pose[d] a serious threat” to the “personal safety” of returning
nationals.” 195 Nevertheless, the International Rescue Committee
191 Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity: The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Feb.
13,
2017),
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/massforced-return-afghan-refugees.
192 See Return of Undocumented Afghans, Weekly Situation Report 17-23 June 2018,
INT’L
ORG.
MIGRATION
(2018),
U.N.
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/situation_reports/file/iom_afghanistanreturn_of_undocumented_afghans-_sitrep_17-23june2018.pdf.
193
Michael Safi, Myanmar Treatment of Rohingya Looks Like ‘Textbook Ethnic
Cleansing’, Says UN, GUARDIAN (Sept. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/7XXL-NVUX
(reporting that U.N. Official deemed Myanmar’s actions “a textbook example of
ethnic cleansing”); Mission Report of OHCHR Rapid Response Mission to Cox’s Bazar,
Bangladesh, OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTS. (Sept. 13–24 2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/MM/CXBMissionSummaryFindin
gsOctober2017.pdf.
194 See Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Urges Saudi Arabia Not to Deport Yemeni
Migrants to War Zone, REUTERS (May 9, 2018, 6:45 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-migrants/u-n-urgessaudi-arabia-not-to-deport-yemeni-migrants-to-war-zone-idUSKBN1IA1F7.
195 Designation of the Republic of Yemen for Temporary Protected Status, FED. REG.
(Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/09/03/201521881/designation-of-the-republic-of-yemen-for-temporary-protected-status
(announcing TPS status for eligible Yemeni nationals residing in the U.S.). See also
Colin Dwyer, Trump Administration Renews Temporary Protected Status for Some Yemenis,
NPR
(July
5,
2018,
8:43
PM),
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estimated that the U.S. action “could ultimately result in the forcible
return of an estimated 400 Yemeni citizens” 196 to an active war zone
that the U.S.-supported 197 Saudi-led coalition is invading.
The small number of Qatari expulsions, framed in terms of a
much larger and ongoing problem, support the timely significance of
the application now before the Court. 198 This case focuses attention on
one aspect of a worldwide problem, as topical today as during the
marauding aftermath of WWI, yet still largely beyond the ambit of
international judicial review.
III. AN ACT OF METAPHORICAL SIGNIFICANCE?
Aside from the factual circumstances of the Qatari expulsions,
the metaphorical significance of portaging this regional drama to the
docket of the ICJ may serve the interests and performative behaviors
of multi-layered audiences, both internal to the disputants, and
external, as presented on the stage of public opinion. Construed as an
act of ceremonial profanation, Qatar’s suit conforms to the framework
analysis of sociologist Erving Goffman, 199 who noted the utility of
https://www.npr.org/2018/07/05/626242262/trump-administration-renewstemporary-protected-status-for-some-yemenis (excluding Yemeni arrivals after
certain dates depending continuous residence and physical presence in the U.S.).
196 IRC Statement on U.S. Decision on Yemen’s Temporary Protected Status, INT’L
RESCUE COMMITTEE (July 5, 2018), https://www.rescue.org/press-release/ircstatement-us-decision-yemen-and-temporary-protected-status.
197 See Melissa Dalton, Hijab Shah, & Timothy Robbins, U.S. Support for Saudi
Military Operations in Yemen, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 23, 2018),
https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-support-saudi-military-operations-yemen (noting
the U.S. has provided “intelligence, military advice, and logistical support to the Saudi
Arabia-led military intervention in Yemen”).
198
In discussing the lingering effect of judicial precedent in international
law, one should always be mindful of the debate regarding art. 59 of the ICJ statute,
which holds that “The decision of the Court has no binding force except between
the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Statute of the International Court
of Justice, ICJ, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute. A well-regarded presentation of
the discussion can be found in R.Y. Jennings, The Judiciary, International and National,
and the Development of International Law, 45 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 1, 6ff. (1996) (on the
value of international judicial precedent).
199 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN
EVERYDAY LIFE (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1959) (discussing the sociology of

42

2019

Game of Thrones: The Qatar Crisis

7:1

interaction rituals used to express both vendetta and victimology, 200
particularly when parties view negotiations as pointless. 201 Expressed
in terms of international law, the weight of the law suggests Qatar’s
suit likely will prevail. Construed by the anti-Terror Quartet as a public
act of shaming or spite, the emotional dynamics of Qatar’s suit may
not go unavenged. 202
A. Courtroom Clash as a Reputational Value
The field of international relations has turned attention to
binary explanations for causes of disputes, certainly since publication
of Samuel Huntington’s immensely influential ‘clash of civilizations’
thesis. 203 The significance of the “clash” metaphor at the level of the
ICJ reinforces the confrontation of countervailing legal principles
dispassionately deconstructed and applied by a disinterested review
body as a definitive resolution to a dispute. Peter Katzenstein and
others have dissected Huntington’s thesis, noting that it undervalues
the discrete, pluralistic and weakly institutionalized underpinnings of
the civilization idea, and that it is factually and empirically incorrect:
“most of the world’s violent clashes occur within rather than between

interaction dynamics and principles of dramaturgy); ERVING GOFFMAN,
INTERACTION RITUAL: ESSAYS IN FACE-TO-FACE BEHAVIOR (1967) (ritualizing
face-work and social interaction encounters).
200
INTERACTION RITUAL, supra note 199, at 86. Counsel for the UAE
alluded to this point in discussions regarding provisional measures. See Qatar v. UAE
Provisional Measures, Verbatim Record 2018/14, June 29, 2018, at 4:30 pm, at 6
(Pellet: “It is sometimes said, Mr. President, that States, some of them at least, exploit
the Court for their own ends. This is a textbook case!”).
201 See Hassan Hassan, There’s No Space for Qatar to Save Face, FOREIGN POL’Y
(June 29, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/29/theres-nospace-for-qatar-to-save-face/ (suggesting the anti-Qatar quartet is not interested in
negotiating).
202 See Part of Prof. David Des Roches Remarks during GIF Panel on the One Year
Anniversary of the Gulf Crisis, GULF INT’L FORUM 2:29 (June 15, 2018),
https://gulfif.com/part-of-prof-david-des-roches-remarks-during-gif-panel-on-theone-year-anniversary-of-the-gulf-crisis/ (noting the crisis has degenerated into
prideful spite actions).
203 See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASS OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (portraying civilizations as coherent,
monolithic, and disposed to clash).
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different civilizations.” 204 To construe this dispute more as a family
feud than an inter-state rivalry layers complexity onto simplistic binary
classifications. Moreover, international law and relations scholars have
rephrased binary clashes, as for instance between legitimacy and
legality, 205 legitimacy and authority, or globalization/modernization
and traditionalism. 206 These counter-positions only further simplify the
multi-tiered relational aspects involved in this case.
As the most politically liberal of the Gulf States, Qatar’s
confrontations within the region attract comparisons to this latter
binary juxtaposition as a force of modernization against tradition.
Qatar’s lack of an indigenous Ulama class of Islamic legal scholars,
powerfully established in Saudi Arabia, contributes to Qatar’s secular
characterization as more comparable to Turkey than Saudi Arabia. 207
However, presentations of this crisis in terms of the structural forces
of globalization overlook the intramural tensions within Wahhabism
and Saudi Arabia’s projection of its status as the Wahhabist
counterforce to Shi’ism. Qatar’s discomfort with Saudi Arabia’s
foreign policy, which projects a de facto alliance with U.S. and Israeli
interests as against Iran, and possible concerns about Saudi Arabia’s
stability, better account for the rudimentary intramural cause of this
crisis rather than any conclusion of a peninsular turn toward
liberalism. 208
204
Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Plural and Pluralist Civilizations: Multiple
Actors, Traditions, and Practices, in CIVILIZATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS: PLURAL AND
PLURALIST PERSPECTIVES 11 (2009).
205 See generally W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
860 (1999); Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1999); Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’: Kosovo,
and the Turn to Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 162 (2002).
206 See Khaled Fattah & K.M. Fierke, A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of
Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 67, 68 (2009)
(reviewing literature on binary clashes).
207
Birol Baskan & Steven Wright, Seeds of Change: Comparing State-Religion
Relations in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, 33 ARAB STUD. Q. 96, 100 (2011) (noting the
comparison to Turkey due to the lack of an indigenous Ulama class within Qatar).
208 See Craig Murray, The Qatar Conundrum, CRAIG MURRAY (June 5, 2017),
https://www.craigmurray.org.uk/archives/2017/06/the-qatar-conundrum/
(associating the blockade with the “Saudi Wahhabist mission to spread sectarian war
against the Shia” rather than on Qatar’s embrace of liberalism); Filkins, supra note 54
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The presumption of the clash metaphor is that formalized
court structures are able to dispose of these clashes by rendering a legal
judgment while not necessarily disposing of the underlying tensions.
Soft law forums may downplay the necessity of rendering judgment
while symbolically removing stigmatic spite actions to backchannel
quarters, blunting, but not necessarily disposing of, tensions magnified
by publicity and theatrics. Since 9/11, emotional dynamics associated
with interstate conflict, particularly as related to terrorism, have
received increasing scholarly attention. 209 However, the formal
mechanisms unlocking the jurisdiction of the ICJ present no
mechanism for dealing with the dynamics of spite, humiliation, or
shaming that stand behind the means of resolving this interstate
conflict.
Qatar’s appeal to the ICJ as a means to enforce compliance
with CERD and remedy a broken relationship with Gulf State
counterparts may rely on the international pressure generated by the
reputation costs associated with noncompliance with an ICJ decision.
This courtroom confrontation presents a symbolic form of dramaturgy
that allows Qatar a self-aware and voluble stage to emote before a
world audience that turns a tin ear to the plight of forced expulsions
elsewhere in the region. 210 Costs associated with defiant
noncompliance diminish a country’s reputational commitment to the

(detailing Saudi pressure, with Trump Administration cooperation, to pressure the
Palestinian Authority to agree to the settlement of the status of Jerusalem and the
West Bank on terms “radically favorable to Israel”); Wahhabbism v. Wahhabism, supra
note 23, at 5 (disassociating liberal reforms in Qatar from “freedoms as defined in
Western societies”).
209 See Khaled Fattah & K.M. Fierke, A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of
Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East, 15 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 67, 68 (2009)
(on the collective sense of humiliation uniting Muslims in the post-9/11 geopolitical
climate); Alex Danchev, “Like A Dog!”:Humiliation and Shame in the War on Terror, 31
ALTERNATIVES: GLOBAL, LOC., POL. 259, 260 (2006) (noting the reciprocal and selfperpetuating consequences of invoking a state of exception to justify violations of
the rule of law in the battle against terrorism).
210 See generally THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, supra note
199 (deriving sociological principles of communication and the art of impression
from principles of dramaturgy).
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rule of law and standing in the international community. 211 Little
evidence suggests that characterizing the UAE as outside the rule of
law will serve as an inducement for or prophylactic against preserving
the efficacy of an ICJ judgment.
B. An Opportunity for the GCC?
Soft power forums present discursive environmental
opportunities removed from traditional multilateral rule-making
formats, often encumbered by asymmetrical relationships between
negotiating interests. 212 They rearrange status-conferring expressions
of decision-making by providing more flexible, informal, or hybrid
methods of discourse and agenda setting. 213 Associational groups such
as Troikas, Wise Men, IGAD, and the Arctic 5 represent examples of
intentionally innovative, flexible sub-multilateral soft law structures
designed to facilitate less formal persuasion channels of
communication. 214 The six original members of the GCC created the
organization to resemble the European Union, with the ideal of
establishing a single common market and monetary system. 215
Heather L. Jones, Why Comply? An Analysis of Trends in Compliance with
Judgments of the International Court of Justice Since Nicaragua, 12 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 57, 65 (2012) (discussing reputational costs and international community
pressure associated with circumventions of ICJ judgments).
212 See Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in
Multilateral Arms Control: Some Compliance Hypotheses, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 59, 65 (2003)
(noting problems of asymmetrical negotiations).
213 See VAN HAM, supra note 106, at 70–71 (discussing the advantages of
more informal and smaller group formation for purposes of dispute settlement).
214 See Christopher R. Rossi, Nagorno-Karabakh and the Minsk Group: The
Imperfect Appeal of Soft Law in an Overlapping Neighborhood, 52 TEX. INT’L L.J. 45, 61
(2017).
215
Mohammed Ahmad Naheem, Legitimacy of the Summer 2017 GCC Crisis
and Qatar’s AML Framework, 20 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 405, 406 (2017).
The six members of the GCC are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE. See Member States, SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF THE GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL,
http://www.gcc-sg.org/enus/AboutGCC/MemberStates/pages/Home.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). An
economic growth projection report concluded that Gulf States economic
consolidation would create the ninth largest economy in the world with the potential
to become the sixth largest economy by 2030. See GCC Could Become the World’s Sixth
Largest
Economy
by
2030:
EY,
EY
(Mar.
20,
2016),
211
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Attempts to turn the GCC into a common security organization predate the organization’s formal birth in 1981. 216 Although perceived as
a stable and positive force on the Arabian Peninsula for almost four
decades, 217 key policy-makers have most recently described the
organization as “pretty much finished.” 218 According to Kristian
Ulrichsen, Qatar’s strained relationship with its Gulf neighbors
represents the barometer of post-Arab Spring politics. 219 “Just as the
uprising that ousted President Mubarak from power galvanized
demonstrators across the region, so the reinstatement of military rule
[in Egypt] sent a clear message about the embedded power of counterrevolutionary forces and vested interests.” 220
Nevertheless, scholars have advocated for a “more insightful
appreciation” of how the sub-state institutional processes of the GCC
have contributed to the complexity of decision making in the Gulf, 221
at a minimum by serving as a forum to sustain diplomatic channels of
communication. The utility of the GCC remains, despite the broad, yet
dysfunctional outlines once oriented toward an economic union or
https://www.ey.com/em/en/newsroom/news-releases/news-ey-gcc-couldbecome-the-worlds-sixth-largest-economy-by-2030 (“hovering just below Japan”).
216 See generally Christian Koch, The GCC As a Regional Security Organization,
KAS INT’L REP. 23 (2010), http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_21076-544-230.pdf?1011101 (discussing the idea of a 1976 defense agreement, as well as the
GCC’s 1990 Doha Declaration on the need for a defense and security arrangement,
Saudi Arabia’s idea of a Peninsula Shield, the 2000 GCC Joint Defense Agreement,
and subsequent intelligence cooperation).
217 See Part of Amb. Anne Patterson Remarks during GIF Panel on the One Year
Anniversary of the Gulf Crisis, GULF INT’L FORUM 0:26 (June 15, 2018),
https://gulfif.com/part-of-amb-anne-patterson-remarks-during-gif-panel-on-the-1year-anniversary-of-the-gulf-crisis/ (lamenting the demise of the GCC, which
“successive American administrations have looked to . . . as an island of stability in
the Middle East.”).
218 Id. at 0:15; Part of Kristian Ulrichsen Remarks during GIF Panel on the One Year
Anniversary of the Gulf Crisis, GULF INT’L FORUM 0:43 (June 15, 2018),
https://gulfif.com/part-of-dr-kristian-ulrichsen-remarks-during-gif-panel-on-theone-year-anniversary-of-the-gulf-crisis/ (casting doubt on “any lingering hopes” for
the GCC). But see Statement of David Des Roches, supra note 202, at 0:47 (noting the
GCC may one day re-emerge after a period of dormancy).
219
Ulrichsen, supra note 25, at 182.
220 Id. at 183.
221
Thompson & Quilliam, supra note 26, at 1–2.
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collective security organization. Historian Hanna Batatu explored the
deep significance of kinship, more so than professional status or
epistemic discourse, as the crucible for holding together Arab power
structures. 222 Sociologist Ali Al-Wardi distinguished Arabian
Peninsular relations in terms of tension with geographic implications
between sedentary (hadara) and more dominant nomadic (badawa)
social structures. 223 Political Scientist Nazih Ayubi hybridized AlWardi’s distinction to include peninsular political tribal associations
that co-existed with the state. 224 Such expressions of group solidarity
operate well below the high political level that many strategists
envision for the GCC.
Establishing the GCC as an effective security structure to
harmonize the operability of regional security and defense systems, or
to put it again on a wishful path of interdependent economic
coordination overplays an eagerness for such integration among
autocrats and yet unduly diminishes a capacity to informally set
agendas among kith and kin. Despite familial and dynastic conflict,
fundamental and mutual concerns remain. Although they contain five
percent of the world’s population, Arab countries endured one-fourth
of the world’s conflicts between 2010–2013 and eighteen percent of
the world’s conflicts between 1948–2014. 225 Almost forty-five percent
of all terrorist attacks occurred in Arab countries in 2014, 226
contributing to an alarming Arab Gulf arms race that spent $181 billion
in 2014 alone. 227 The perceived need to preserve a stage for discussion
222 See generally Hanna Batatu, Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria’s
Ruling, Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance, 35 MIDDLE EAST J. 331 (1981).
223 See NAZIH N. AYUBI, OVER-STATING THE ARAB STATE: POLITICS AND
SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 50 (2009); HALIM BARAKAT, THE ARAB WORLD:
SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND STATE 49–50, 68 (1993) (discussing Al-Wardi); YOUSSEF
H. ABOUL-ENEIN, IRAQ IN TURMOIL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF DR. ALI ALWARDI, FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO KING FEISAL 3 (2012) (on Al-Wardi’s
interest in the social-psychological tension between tribes and towns and Iraqi
character).
224 See AYUBI, supra note 223, at 51.
225 Arab Human Development Report 2016, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME 175 (2016),
http://www.arab-hdr.org/reports/2016/english/AHDR2016En.pdf.
226 Id. at 174.
227
Anthony H. Cordesman, Losing in Every Direction: The Arab Game of
STRATEGIC
&
INT’L
STUD.
(Jan.
30,
2018),
Thrones,
CTR.
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suggests the viability of a soft law forum in the Arabian Peninsula,
within or without the structure of the GCC. Some form of soft law
association will outdistance GCC detractors. It is noteworthy that
throughout the duration of this embargo, “the largest and longest gas
pipeline in the Middle East,” pumping two billion standard cubic feet
per day of refined methane gas from Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City
to the UAE, 228 has remained open and unaffected by the blockade. A
purposeful intent to recapture a dwindling sense of asabîyah may
account less for this uninterrupted flow than the forty-nine percent
interest in the pipeline company held by French and U.S.
conglomerates. 229 At a minimum, however, important common
commercial interests suggest a continuing basis for quiet diplomacy
and the means by which distracted major powers can facilitate deescalation of tensions now before the ICJ.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ibn Khaldûn’s generational theory of dynastic decline charted
the fractious, ineffective, and personalized quarrels that detract from
organized growth models and contribute to political instability and
regional upheaval. Despite “rapid economic growth” since 1990, labor

https://www.csis.org/analysis/losing-every-direction-arab-game-thrones. See also
Anthony H. Cordesman & Michael Peacock, Military Spending and Arms Sales in the
Gulf: How the Arab Gulf States Now Dominate the Changes in the Military Balance, CTR.
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 4, 5 (Apr. 28, 2015), https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/150428_gulfarmssales.pdf (noting massive
Arab Gulf state expenditures but little else to ensure “interoperability, common
training,” and integrated facilities).
228 Subsea
Export
Pipeline,
DOLPHIN
ENERGY,
http://www.dolphinenergy.com/operations (detailing the 48-inch, 364-kilometer
subsea export pipeline with a design capacity to 3.2 billion scf/day) (last visited Sept.
23, 2018).
229
The pipeline, part of Dolphin Energy’s gas project, cost $6.2 billion to
build. The Mubadala Development Company, formed by the Government of Abu
Dhabi, owns 51 percent of Dolphin Energy, with the French conglomerate, Total,
and the U.S.-based Occidental Petroleum owning 24.5 percent each. About Us,
DOLPHIN ENERGY, http://www.dolphinenergy.com/about (last visited Dec. 16,
2018).
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productivity in the Gulf State region continues to decline. 230 The
challenge for a new generation of Gulf leaders will be to break the
inertial bond of rentier development that impedes labor productivity
and entrepreneurialism, 231 and restore the diminished sense of asabîyah
that now results in dynastic factionalism.
Qatar has unique advantages. It has a $320 billion sovereign
wealth fund. 232 It owns more assets in London than the Queen of
England, about ten percent of the Empire State Building, Paris’s SaintGermain Football Club, and numerous other global holdings. 233 It is
“the world’s biggest producer of liquefied natural gas” (“LNG”), 234
controls thirty percent of this world market, 235 and dominates the AsiaPacific trade, “the world’s largest LNG-importing region.” 236 Qatar
Arab Human Development Report 2016, supra note 225, at 80.
Id. at 79. See also Steffen Hertog, The Private Sector and Reform in the Gulf
Cooperation Council, LONDON SCH. ECON. & POL. SCI. KUWAIT PROGRAMME NO. 30
2 (2013), https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/54398/1/Hertog_2013.pdf (noting that “GCC
capitalists remain an appendix to the state”).
232
Mohammed Sergie, Qatar to Curb Transfers to Its Sovereign Fund Until 2022,
(Mar.
14,
2018,
9:00
AM),
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-14/qatar-says-to-curbtransfers-to-its-sovereign-fund-until-2022.
233 See Uptin Saiidi, Qatar Boasts Massive Global Holdings—Here Are Some of its
Headline
Assets,
CNBC
(July
3,
2017,
10:03
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/03/qatar-boasts-massive-global-holdings--hereare-some-of-its-headline-assets.html. See also Peter Beaumont, How Qatar Is Taking
(July
7,
2012),
On
the
World,
GUARDIAN
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/07/qatar-takes-on-the-world
(noting Qatar’s principal ownership of western Europe’s tallest building (London’s
Shard), Harrod’s department store, and Barclays Bank, among other ventures).
234
Sergie, supra note 232. Qatar pulled out of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) on January 1, 2019, claiming it wanted to focus on
natural gas production. Bill Chappel, Qatar Will Pull Out of OPEC, As Rift With Saudi
Arabia
Deepens,
NPR
(Dec.
3,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/12/03/672839704/qatar-will-pull-out-of-opec-as-riftwith-saudi-arabia-deepens (announcing the pull out).
235
Frank A. Verrastro & Jon B. Alterman, Qatar Crisis: Turmoil in the GCC,
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&
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STUD.
(June
14,
2017),
CTR.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/qatar-crisis-turmoil-gcc.
236
John Calabrese, Global LNG Markets in a State of Flux: Qatar in the
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12,
2017),
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shares the world’s largest gas field with Iran, 237 which necessarily
implies the need to manage a relationship worth potentially trillions of
dollars. 238 Additionally, Qatar insures against a breakdown in that
relationship by subsidizing 239 and hosting the largest U.S. airbase in the
Middle East, 240 which provides Qatar with much needed security
insurance against Iran and increasingly, Saudi Arabia, given its supreme
disadvantage: less than fifteen percent of Qatar’s population of 2.7
million are nationals. 241
With so few citizens and so much wealth, Qatar easily insulates
its domestic population from the popular movements that have
disrupted the Arab street. A change in Saudi Arabia’s succession plan
witnessed on June 21, 2017 the Saudi king’s appointment of his son,
Mohammed bin Salman as crown prince, replacing the king’s nephew,
Mohammed bin Nayef as heir apparent to the throne. Machinations
involving that power consolidation, 242 Saudi Arabia’s badly progressing
237
Robin M. Mills, The World’s Biggest Gas Field Lies Between Qatar and Iran—
(July
20,
2017),
and
the
Race
is
on,
BUSINESSDAY
https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2017-07-20-the-worlds-biggest-gasfield-lies-between-qatar-and-iran--and-the-race-is-on/.
238 See Harrison Jacobs, The 17 Countries Sitting on the Most Valuable Energy
(Feb.
14,
2014,
3:53
AM),
Reserves, BUS. INSIDER (AUSTL.)
https://www.businessinsider.com.au/countries-with-most-energy-reserves-20142#8-qatar-11 (detailing Qatar’s 885.1 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves
at an estimated future value at current prices of $16.4 trillion).
239 See Paul McLeary, Can Trump Find a Better Deal Than the U.S. Air Base in
POL’Y
(July
20,
2017,
12:23
PM),
Qatar?
FOREIGN
https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/20/can-trump-find-a-better-deal-than-the-u-sair-base-in-qatar/ (noting subsidized operation costs at Al Udeid air base).
240 See Niall McCarthy, Where U.S. Troops Are in The Middle East [Infographic],
(June
7,
2017,
8:25
AM),
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/niallmccarthy/2017/06/07/qatar-hosts-largest-u-sbase-in-the-middle-east-despite-allegedly-funding-extremisminfographic/#25e05503dc7e (calling the base the largest in the Middle East).
241 Qatar
Population
2018,
WORLD
POPULATION
REV.,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/qatar-population/ (last visited Sept.
23, 2018). On Qatar’s “evasive pretense” of not releasing indigenous population data
to “hide the small size of [its] national population,” see Onn Winckler, How Many
Qatari Nationals Are There? 22 MIDDLE E. Q. (Mar. 1, 2015),
https://www.meforum.org/articles/2015/how-many-qatari-nationals-are-there.
242 See Dexter Filkins, A Saudi Prince’s Quest to Remake the Middle East, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/04/09/a-
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war in Yemen, a distracted if not inconsistent U.S. foreign policy in the
region, 243 which may have contributed to Secretary of State Tillerson’s
abrupt departure, 244 forestall coordinated action and occlude
consideration of the intramural peninsular rivalries that have long
turned the region into a game of thrones. 245 Such distractions
contribute to forms of ceremonial profanation that, on the one hand
threaten to turn Qatar into an island through construction of a moat,
and on the other hand seek an aspirational judicial resolution at the
ICJ. Such are the choices produced on a public stage.
As dysfunctional as the situation may appear, the most likely
means of restoring at least a modicum asabîyah would be to remove the
dispute from the center stage of peninsular politics, which poses a
zero-sum solution for Qatar and Saudi Arabia/UAE. Despite the
sounding death-knell of the GCC, movements off the political and
juridical center stage appear to be taking shape. Qatar should have
good reason to choose a softer route, unless it senses the generational
demise of the House of Al Saud is approaching.

saudi-princes-quest-to-remake-the-middle-east (detailing Mohammed bin Salman’s
“messy battle over succession to the throne, which American security officials
warned might destabilize the kingdom.”); Josh Lederman & Dennis Romero, CIA
Concludes Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Ordered Killing of Khashoggi, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/cia-concludessaudi-crown-prince-mohammed-bin-salman-ordered-killing-n937476 (reporting that
the CIA concluded with “high confidence” that the Saudi Crown Prince ordered the
killing of a journalist critic of the regime).
243 See Russell A. Berman, Saudi Arabia or Iran in US Strategy, HOOVER INST.
(June 19, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/saudi-arabia-or-iran-us-strategy
(noting the preoccupation with major and shifting strategic differences between the
Obama and Trump administrations involving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, more familiarly dubbed the “Iran Deal”).
244 See Emmons, supra note 74.
245 See Mohammed Alyahya, The Rift with Qatar as Seen in Riyadh, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL (June 13, 2017), http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/therift-with-qatar-as-seen-in-riyadh (on disruptions and deceits in the Qatari royal family
dating to Sheikh Khalifa bin Hamad’s overthrow of his cousin in 1972. Hamad was
then overthrown by his son, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in 1995, who began to take
a more independent tack until pressured by Saudi Arabia to abdicate the emirship to
his son, Tamim in 2013, who, in turn, is viewed with suspicion by Saudi Arabia and
its allies).
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